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MITIGATING THE CONSTITUTIONAL & RULE OF LAW 
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ABSTRACT 
Over the last decade increased emphasis has been placed on the role 
that artificial intelligence (AI) will play in disrupting the practice of 
law. Although considerable attention has been given to the practical 
task of designing a computer to “think like a lawyer,” a number of  
related issues merit further inquiry. Of these, the risks that AI presents 
to the constitutionally protected procedural and substantive dimen-
sions of justice deserve particular attention. In this Article, we consider 
the public and private application of AI in the administration of justice 
and the provision of legal services. We observe that the imposition of  
AI in certain legal contexts and settings has the potential to silence  
discourse between actors and agents, subvert the rule of law, and  
directly and indirectly threaten constitutional rights. In substantiating 
these observations, we begin in Part I by contextualizing recent devel-
opments in legal technology. Tracing the evolution of rule-based AI  
approaches through to modern data-driven techniques, in Part II we 
explore how AI systems have sought to represent law, drawing on the 
domains of: (a) judicial interpretation and reasoning; (b) bargaining 
and transacting; and (c) enforcement and compliance, and we illustrate 
how these representations have been constrained by the AI approach 
used. In Part III we assess the use of AI in legal services, focusing  
specifically on implications that are posed in respect of the protection of 
constitutional rights and adherence to the rule of law. Finally, in Part 
IV we examine the pragmatic challenges that arise in balancing the 
risks and rewards of AI technologies in the legal domain, and we  
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consider the issues that should shape and that are likely to shape its 
use. We conclude by proposing the development of a “rule of legal AI” 
designed to solidify the shared values that ought to govern future  
development in the field. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
A.   Context 
For over five decades researchers have attempted to apply tech-
niques from the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) to computationally 
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model aspects of legal decision-making.1 These endeavors have led  
to the creation of a variety of different systems within and outside of 
academia, relatively few of which have managed to make the transi-
tion from the lab to the marketplace.2 However, over the last few years, 
tools employing AI and designed to support legal task completion have 
come to occupy an increasingly important role in public and private 
legal services delivery. When combined with substantial growth in the 
number of legal tech start-ups,3 recent trends in technology adoption 
exhibit a new direction for a profession who as recently as 2016 were 
accused of working practices largely unchanged since the time of 
Charles Dickens.4  
For those familiar with the propensity of technology to succumb  
to reoccurring “hype cycles,” 5  recent developments may be easily  
dismissed as a passing fad. For others, the influence of AI is not some-
thing that should be so easily disregarded; not at least without a more 
involved examination of the potential consequences that arise when 
such technologies are given free rein to “weave themselves into the 
fabric of everyday life until they are indistinguishable from it.” 6  
Computer systems (particularly those charged with assisting decision-
making) present as neutral and value-free, capable of enhancing  
rather than detracting from the structural integrity of the legal system 
by minimizing the risks of human error/discretion.7 However, such 
systems cannot be judged purely on design, without regard to the  
seen and unforeseen consequences that arise in implementation.  
 
 5. See Vicky Harris, Artificial Intelligence and the Law - Innovation in a Laggard 
Market?, 3 J.L. & INFO. SCI. 287, 287 (1992); Edwina L. Rissland et al., AI and Law: A 
Fruitful Synergy, 150 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 1, 6 (2003) (discussing Mehl’s Automation 
in the Legal World conference paper proposing the use of logic for information retrieval and 
inference in 1958—only two years after the concept of AI was first defined by McCarthy). 
 6. Richard E. Susskind, Expert Systems in Law: Out of the Research Laboratory and 
into the Marketplace, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1ST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 4 (1987) [hereinafter Susskind, Out of the Research 
Labratory]; Philip Leith, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Expert System, 30 INT’L REV. L., 
COMPUTERS, & TECH. 94, 99 (2016); Anja Oskamp & Marc Lauritsen, AI in Law Practice? So 
Far, Not Much, 10 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 227, 227 (2002). 
 7. See, e.g., Stanford Codex Center for Legal Informatics, STANFORD CODEX, 
http://techindex.law.stanford.edu (last visited July 1, 2017) (listing 713 entries in June 2017, 
up from 557 entries recorded in Oct. 2016). 
 8. Michael Skapinker, Technology: Breaking the Law, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 11,  
2016), https://www.ft.com/content/c3a9347e-fdb4-11e5-b5f5-070dca6d0a0d) [https://perma. 
cc/2CQQ-L72Y] (quoting Richard Susskind & Daniel Susskind). 
 9. Gartner Inc., Gartner's 2016 Hype Cycle for Emerging Technologies Identifies Three 
Key Trends That Organizations Must Track to Gain Competitive Advantage, GARTNER.COM 
(Aug. 16, 2017), http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3412017 (last visited Mar. 18, 2020). 
 10. Mark Weiser, The Computer for the 21st Century, 265 SCI. AM. 94, 94 (1991).  
 11. See, e.g., Linda J. Skitka et al., Accountability and Automation Bias, 52 INT’L J. 
HUMAN-COMPUTER STUD. 701, 702 (2000) (discussing the potential for automation to reduce 
error). 
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Although AI systems have the potential to guard against human 
failings (whether those failings relate to capability, efficiency, or self-
control), such tools fundamentally change how people approach their 
work, how systems are organized and operated, and where accounta-
bility vests for mistakes.8 Where decisions involve matters of personal 
freedom, liberty, or the exercise of rights and responsibilities—as is 
the case in relation to civil and criminal law—the stakes are vastly 
higher. Power—whether vested in man or machine—must be accom-
panied by a commensurate degree of accountability. The values of the 
justice system that humans strive to uphold are the same values 
against which AI technology must also be measured. Although  
there has been considerable attention given to the technical issues of 
designing a computer to “think like a lawyer,” there remains a need 
for greater reflection as to the theoretical, jurisprudential, and philo-
sophical consequences that accompany this achievement.  
In this Article we address this gap, offering a framework by which 
to understand the application of AI to law and a means by which to 
assess the impact of this application. We commence in Part I with a 
series of definitions that contextualize the analysis in the sections that 
follow. Tracing the evolution of rule-based AI approaches through to 
modern data-driven techniques, in Part II we explore how AI systems 
have sought to represent law, drawing on the domains of: (a) judicial 
interpretation and reasoning, (b) bargaining and transacting, and (c) 
enforcement and compliance, and we illustrate how these representa-
tions have been constrained by the AI approach used. In Part III we 
assess the use of AI in legal services, focusing specifically on implica-
tions that are posed in respect of the protection of constitutional rights 
and adherence to the rule of law. Finally, in Part IV we examine the 
pragmatic challenges that arise in balancing the risks and rewards  
of AI technologies in the legal domain, and we consider the issues  
that should shape, and are likely to shape, its use. We conclude by 
proposing the development of a “rule of legal AI” designed to solidify 
the shared values that ought to govern future development in the field. 
We argue that law is a mechanism for balancing competing inter-
ests, providing the infrastructure within which those competing  
interests exist and can be expressed and reconciled. We observe that 
the imposition of AI in certain legal contexts and settings has the po-
tential to silence discourse between actors and agents, subvert the rule 
of law, and directly and indirectly threaten constitutional rights. We 
see this threat as the product of a dualist assumption that it is possible 
to represent the “law” using technology without that representation 
being influenced or constrained by its enabling apparatus (technologi-
cal or otherwise). We propose that understanding and making explicit 
 
 12. Id. at 701–02. 
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the model of law being imposed by a particular form of AI is a critical 
step. One that better positions us to deploy AI in a way that strength-
ens constitutional values, promotes adherence to the rule of law, and 
more fairly distributes the associated risks and benefits of new tech-
nologies.  
B.   Definitions 
For the purpose of the analysis that follows in Parts II, III, and IV, 
it is necessary for us to clarify our terminology at the outset. In this 
section we define our use of the terms “artificial intelligence,” “law,” 
and the “rule of law,” and briefly outline the assumptions that inform 
this use. 
1. Artificial Intelligence 
AI is a broad term incorporating activities involving the design  
and development of machines, which mimic some of the cognitive func-
tions of the human mind. Whilst AI commonly conjures up thoughts  
of sentient machines, early experiments in the second half of the  
20th century demonstrated the difficulty of replicating the (largely  
unknown) operations of the human brain to produce “general intelli-
gence.”9 Work within the field has since focused on the development of 
systems that can perform tasks in relation to specific sub-domains of 
intelligence, such as learning, problem solving, reasoning, gathering 
and understanding knowledge, perception, and communication.  
General AI requires more than the ability to perform a certain action 
or series of actions. It requires a system to be capable of undertaking 
decision-making or inference tasks in pursuit of multiple different 
goals, by drawing on data received via a system of perception such  
as a camera, sensor, and data packages transferred via networks,  
keyboard, mice, or microphone.10 Importantly, AI is considered a mov-
ing target with a degree of ephemerality, or as Professor David Miller 
describes, “whatever machines haven’t learned to do yet.”11  
Symbolic approaches to AI development (exemplified by expert  
systems, logic systems, and information retrieval systems) character-
ized much of the early work in the field.12 These approaches focused  
 
 13. John R. Searle, Minds, Brains, and Programs, 3 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 417, 417–18 
(1980). 
 14. STUART RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN 
APPROACH 25–27 (3d ed. 2010). 
 15. Jim Dator, Artilectual Salutations, 6 J. FUTURE STUD. 87, 89 (2001) (citing Professor 
David Miller, a robotics specialist at the International Space University and the University 
of Oklahoma). 
 16. See, e.g., Michael Aikenhead, The Uses and Abuses of Neural Networks in Law, 12 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 31, 32 (1996); Andrew Terrett, Neural 
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on the representation of knowledge, with knowledge as to how to  
reach a goal embedded within the design of the program. More recent 
efforts have been directed towards sub-symbolic (or “data-driven”)  
approaches such as machine learning, which create a representation 
of knowledge or latent rules through modeling and analyzing data  
using statistical methods. In contrast to symbolic approaches, rules 
are not imposed at the outset deterministically, but are instead discov-
ered (inferred) by mapping outcomes (the correct answer) as a function 
of inputs (the “facts”). This permits the reverse engineering of rules 
(which can later be transposed into rule based systems)13 that capture 
how the world works in practice and also enables generalization—the 
ability for systems to extrapolate from the knowledge they have  
ingested to make predictions from inputs (combinations of data) never 
before encountered.  
For over three decades AI projects have attempted to understand 
and model legal reasoning. Much of the 1980s was spent speculating 
as to the possibility that rule-based systems would replace the work of 
lawyers14 and some went so far as to argue that this would lead to su-
perior results because “finding chains of consequences in laws, and 
finding where laws contradict each other, are ideal tasks for computers 
and are often done poorly by humans.”15 The idea that AI systems can 
be designed to find chains of consequences in law is in principle quite 
simple. However, in practice it requires an agreed interpretation of 
what the law actually is—this is far from settled and debate as to how 
it should be settled exposes longstanding tensions between divergent 
strands of legal theory.  
2. Law 
Many theories have been offered in pursuit of explaining what the 
law is—effectively attempting to make sense of what to some would 
 
Networks—Towards Predictive Law Machines, 3 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 94, 110 (1995); 
David R. Warner, Jr., A Neural Network-Based Law Machine: Initial Steps, 18 RUTGERS 
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 51, 53–54 (1992); Jürgen Hollatz, Analogy Making in Legal 
Reasoning with Neural Networks and Fuzzy Logic, 7 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 289, 290 
(1999); Dan Hunter, Commercialising Legal Neural Networks, J. INFO., L. & TECH. at § 1 
(1996); John Zeleznikow & Andrew Stranieri, The Split-Up System: Integrating Neural 
Networks and Rule-Based Reasoning in the Legal Domain, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 5TH 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 185, 185 (1995).  
 17. See, e.g., Nicholas Frosst & Geoffrey Hinton, Distilling a Neural Network Into a Soft 
Decision Tree, in CEX WORKSHOP AT AI*IA 2017 CONFERENCE at § 7 (2017); Qinglong Wang 
et al., A Comparative Study of Rule Extraction for Recurrent Neural Networks, CORNELL U. 
ARXIV (2018), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.05420.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6ZM-FNVM]. 
 18. E.g., Graham Greenleaf, Legal Expert Systems—Robot Lawyers? An Introduction to 
Knowledge-Based Applications to Law, in AUSTRALIAN LEGAL CONVENTION at § 1–5  (1989); 
Leith, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Expert System, supra note 2, at 94.  
 19. DONALD MICHIE & RORY JOHNSTON, THE CREATIVE COMPUTER: MACHINE 
INTELLIGENCE AND HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 54 (1st ed. 1984). 
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appear as an incoherent patchwork of rights and duties. Efforts to  
explain “law” often represent it as: the product of a socially accepted 
process, the proclamations of a sovereign entity, judicial decision- 
making,16 the normative expectations held by society as to appropriate 
behavior, 17  and/or, commands backed by threat. 18  Within this  
contested space, distilling the complexity of law into a framework  
for understanding is not an easy task. 
Unifying differing explanations inevitably lead us down the path of 
legal pluralism, in which it is accepted that one or more valid explana-
tions might exist and even interact.19 On this view, law may be seen  
as a contestable construct that emerges from the action and reaction 
between agents and (formal and informal, internal and external,  
normative and non-normative) structures, existing not just a system 
of rules intended to control behavior but a system by which to enable 
access to fair outcomes. For the purposes of this Paper, we take this 
pluralistic perspective as our starting point. This provides a frame-
work against which we can map the intersection points between  
AI and the creation, interpretation, application, and enforcement of 
law as these relate to: (i) judicial decision-making and reasoning, (ii) 
private bargaining and transacting, and (iii) public enforcement and 
private compliance.  
The legal processes, relationships, rules, and obligations that arise 
in respect of each of these domains of activity are governed by a theory 
of order, understood as the “rule of law.” This term embodies the  
 
 
 
 
 20. Roscoe Pound, Theories of Law, 22 YALE L.J. 114, 114–16 (1912–1913) [hereinafter 
Pound, Theories of Law]; Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 261 (Dennis M. Patterson ed., 1st ed. 1996) [hereinafter Leiter, 
Legal Realism]. 
 21. EUGEN EHRLICH & WALTER LEWIS, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY 
OF LAW 24 (2001). Ehrlich notes: “it is not an essential element of the concept of law that it 
be created by the state, nor that it constitute the basis for the decisions of the courts or other 
tribunals . . .” Id. Normative legal interpretation is an expression of Durkheim’s ‘collective 
consciousness’—the beliefs and sentiments universal to a people within society. See also 
E ́MILE DURKHEIM & W. D. HALLS, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY xix (1997). 
 22. Austin’s command theory perceives law as command backed by threat or sanction—
a view in which both the command and the threat are integral criteria for something to be 
considered “law.” Sandra Raponi, Is Coercion Necessary for Law? The Role of Coercion in 
International and Domestic Law, 8 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 35, 41–43 (2015). Hart offers an 
alternative position, with the view that enforcement is self-generating: compliance derives 
from a perception that one is under an obligation to obey rules, leading to social acceptance 
of rules as constraints upon behavior. Id. at 43–46. For a concise overview of Hart and Austin 
on enforcement, see id. at 41–46. 
 23. Baudouin Dupret, Legal Pluralism, Plurality of Laws, and Legal Practices: 
Theories, Critiques, and Praxiological Re-specification, 1 EUR. J. LEGAL STUD. 296, 297 
(2007); John Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 
1, 5 (1986). 
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constraints that guard against the arbitrary exercise of power and 
which enable justice to operate in a manner consistent with the  
principles of liberal democracy.20 
3. The “Rule of Law” 
Exclusive rights, such as the authority to make new formal laws, 
are bestowed upon only some members of society. These rights amount 
to a transfer of power that cannot be given without restraint. Govern-
ance is therefore subject to the “rule of law,” which demands that “the 
making of particular laws should be guided by open and relatively  
stable general rules”21 that promote equality, fairness, predictability, 
transparency, and accessibility.22 When taken in conjunction with the 
absence of corruption and the existence of democratic accountability, 
the rule of law forms part of a critical triumvirate23 where it is seen as 
the “lynchpin for stable government,” and “part of the universal duty 
incumbent on all humanity.”24 
The view of the “rule of law as the law of rules” implies both a  
constraint on behavior as well as an aspirational framework. As a  
theory of order rather than of law, adherence to the rule of law does 
not presuppose a particular outcome, but does govern the process of 
arriving at that outcome.25 This is not to say that the scope or purpose 
of the “rule of law” is agreed—“[l]egal philosophers advance highly  
nuanced analyses of the rule of law and its contours,”26 and to this, 
public agencies often add their own interpretations that focus on  
 
 24. Randy E. Barnett, Can Justice and the Rule of Law Be Reconciled, 11 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 597, 622–23 (1988) (discussing the relationship between power and the rule of 
law); Lord Bingham, The Rule of Law, 66 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 67, 84–85 (2007) (discussing the 
rule of law generally). 
 25. Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON 
LAW AND MORALITY 210, 213 (1979). 
 26. Bingham, supra note 20, at 5. It should be noted that various authors have sought 
to describe the “rule of law” in slightly different ways. See, e.g., THE COLLECTED WORKS OF 
F.A. HAYEK, VOL. XVII: THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY: THE DEFINITIVE EDITION (Ronald 
Hamowy ed., 2011); Raz, supra note 21, at 213; Noel Cox, Editorial: The Rule of Law as the 
Product of the Interplay between Potentially Conflicting Conceptions, 101 ROUND TABLE 299–
302 (2012); Michael L Principe, Albert Venn Dicey and the Principles of the Rule of Law: Is 
Justice Blind? A Comparative Analysis of the United States and Great Britain, 22 LOY. L.A. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 357, 371 (2000); ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 202–03 (1982). 
 27. Amir N. Licht et al., Culture Rules: The Foundations of the Rule of Law and Other 
Norms of Governance, 35 J. COMP. ECO. 659, 663 (2007). 
 28. Cox, supra note 22, at 299. 
 29. Noel B. Reynolds, Legal Theory and the Rule of Law, NEWSL. PHIL. & L. (Am. Philos. 
Ass’n Newark, DE), Spring 2002, at 119. 
 30. Licht et al., supra note 23, at 663–64.  
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dimensions of policy or economic development. 27  Notwithstanding 
these differing views (a detailed analysis of which is beyond the scope 
of this Paper), the rule of law is generally said to prioritize a number 
of key features, included among which are: stable and prospective 
rules, an independent judiciary, limits on discretion, observance of the 
principles of natural justice, accessible courts, and the constraint of 
power/authority.28  
In the United States, the principles enshrined in the rule of law find 
formal expression via the written constitution (and accompanying 
amendments) which operates to limit government, impose checks and 
balances, ensure the separation of powers, and guarantee citizens 
basic rights, such as equal protection and due process. The principles 
and values at the heart of the rule of law and in respect of which  
the constitution is silent, also find expression informally outside of a 
constitutional framework, via statute, common law, and norms of  
behavior. In jurisdictions where a codified constitution does not exist, 
such as the United Kingdom, this model of informal expression has 
given rise to what is known as an “unwritten constitution.”29 For the 
purposes of the forthcoming analysis, we use “rule of law” to refer to 
both of these formal and informal expressions so as to accommodate 
the varying degrees of formality by which they are recognized in  
various jurisdictions. 
II.   THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW MACHINES 
Amplified by claims that vast parts of the legal profession can be 
turned over to machines, the potential of AI and machine learning (ML) 
in law has been met with both enthusiasm and existential anxiety.30 
Yet for these claims to be plausible, it must be possible for a computer 
to replicate dimensions of “human legal intelligence.” In this section 
we examine the development of “law machines” in relation to the  
creation, interpretation, application, and enforcement of law, examin-
ing three key areas where progress has been focused: (1) judicial 
 
 31. See, e.g., What is the Rule of Law?, WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, https:// 
worldjusticeproject.org/about-us/overview/what-rule-law (last visited Jan. 19, 2018)  
(explaining that the UN, advances a human-rights centric definition as compared to the 
World Justice Project). 
 32. See, e.g., Greenleaf, supra note 22, at § 1–5; Leith, The Rise and Fall of the Legal 
Expert System, supra note 2, at 94.  
 33. John Baker, The Unwritten Constitution of the United Kingdom, 15 ECCLESIASTICAL 
L.J. 4, 19 (2013). 
 34. See, e.g., Chris Weller, Law Firms of the Future Will be Filled with Robot  
Lawyers, BUSINESS INSIDER (July 7, 2016, 12:09 PM), https://www.businessinsider. 
com/law-firms-are-starting-to-use-robot-lawyers-2016-7); James O’Toole, Here Come the 
Robot Lawyers, CNN BUSINESS (Mar. 28, 2014, 7:16 AM), https://money.cnn.com/ 
2014/03/28/technology/innovation/robot-lawyers/ [https://perma.cc/7U4A-Z3K7]. 
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interpretation and reasoning, (2) private bargaining and transacting, 
and (3) public enforcement and private regulatory compliance. 
A.   Judicial Interpretation & Reasoning 
Much of the work of lawyers in the field of litigation is directed at 
predicting what a court might decide when interpreting the law, or 
when applying the law to a particular factual scenario.31 Whilst it is 
not possible to know with absolute certainty how it is that judges rea-
son, a number of theories have been offered.32 These describe legal rea-
soning as the analysis of legal rules enshrined in legal sources using 
methods that are: logical and deductive; analogical and comparative; 
or subjective and discretionary, and these approaches to explaining 
reasoning have underpinned the development of a range of different 
AI systems intended to replicate the process of legal interpretation.  
1. Rules & Rule-Based Systems 
For formalists, the role of the judge is not to make law but rather 
to bring clarity to the existing law (whatever its source) by engaging 
in textual analysis to understand the plain meaning of the words  
intended to bring that law into effect. Thus, legal reasoning (and  
the laws elucidated through this process) is borne out of logical  
deduction in which conclusions necessarily follow from the premises. 
For example:  
If A, then B 
A ∴ B  
The internal logic of the proposition is valid: it holds true no matter 
what the values of A and B.  
If the law is interpreted in the way that the formalists propose,  
then the task of the judge is merely to apply the appropriate rules of 
interpretation. The law is largely stable, and discretion is limited. 
Given the same inputs (legislation, existing cases, a contract), same 
training (and legal education is broadly consistent within jurisdic-
tions), and task (interpreting the meaning of a particular source) it 
should be possible for a legal professional to anticipate the likely  
 
 35. Dru Stevenson & Nicholas J. Wagoner, Bargaining in the Shadow of Big Data, 67 
FLA. L. REV. 1337, 1339 (2015). 
 36. E.g., E.C. Lashbrooke, Jr., Legal Reasoning and Artificial Intelligence, 34 LOY. L. 
REV. 287, 287 (1988); see also NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 
(2003); STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING (3d ed. 2007) 
(an introductory book meant to teach law students how to mimic the legal analysis used by 
judges and lawyers); Wilson Huhn, The Stages of Legal Reasoning: Formalism, Analogy, and 
Realism, 48 VILL. L. REV. 305, 307 (2003); Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal 
Reasoning, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 501 (1948); Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 
99 COLUM. L. REV. 1138, 1138 (1999). 
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interpretation a judge will reach. When cast in this light, the law is 
the product of an objective, detached reasoning process, in which fixed 
rules are applied to source materials.  
This being the case, it is not difficult to see how one might develop 
a rule-based system that simulates deductive reasoning (if A then B, 
if B then C, ∴ if A then C). The development of logic programming  
languages in the 1980s made this possible, for unlike procedural  
languages in which variables and relationships had to be defined in 
advance, logic programming (implemented using languages such as 
Prolog) permitted inferences to be drawn by setting a series of logic 
conditions. These conditions form the attributes a solution must  
possess, rather than the steps that must be taken to achieve a solution. 
Through a computational process called unification, the system  
identifies all possible solutions capable of satisfying underlying logic. 
An example of this process is detailed in Figure 1.  
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In procedural programming ‘Who’ could not equal ‘bob’, unless Who = ‘bob’ had been  
previously specified within the system. In logic programming it is possible to pass in  
uninstantiated arguments such as ‘Who’. Via a process called ‘unification’, the interpreter 
will attempt to deduce what ‘Who’ should equal using previously defined rules/clauses.33 
This process is shown below.  
 
Similarly, the query ‘-? Colleagues (james, Who)’ would match ‘Colleagues’ first, and then 
seek to match james in the first position in the open parenthesis. As clause 4 matches the 
query ‘Colleagues (James,    ) the system would return the value Who = mary.  
QUERY:  ‘colleagues (susan, james)?’ 
 
GOAL 1: Match ‘colleagues’ on the left side of any clauses, preceding the  
parenthesis. 
MATCHED: Clause 3, 4 and 5 
 
GOAL 2: ‘susan’ and ‘james’ in the correct ordered position within the  
parenthesis for clauses 3, 4 and 5. 
MATCHED Clause 5 – ‘susan’ is in the correct position & ‘james’ matches ‘x’  
(which denotes ‘anyone’). 
 
GOAL 3: Match the right side of Clause 5 – ‘Lawyer (james) & Colleagues  
(james, mary)’ 
MATCHED Lawyer (james) is proven by Clause 2 and Colleagues (james,  
mary) is proven by Clause 4. 
 
OUTPUT: Colleagues (susan, james)? = TRUE 
Prolog Clause Meaning 
1. Lawyer (john) John is a Lawyer 
2. Lawyer (james) James is a Lawyer 
3. Colleagues (john, mary) John and Mary are colleagues 
4. Colleagues (james, mary) James and Mary are colleagues 
5. Colleagues (susan, x) <- Lawyer (x) &  
Colleagues (x, mary) 
Susan works with any Lawyer that 
works with Mary 
Query Meaning 
I. Colleagues (susan, james)? Are Susan and James colleagues? 
II. -? Colleagues (james, Who) Who is a colleague of James? 
 
Figure 1. Logic Programming: An Example Using Prolog 
The development of rule-based systems involved experts in various 
domains attempting to distill their reasoning processes into a chain  
of deductive logic, in which the conclusions follow from the premise 
(“modus ponens”).34 This logic was replicated computationally with a 
knowledge base (a set of facts) and a rules-engine (a set of rules that 
describes what role the facts have on an outcome, e.g., IF, THEN). 
These symbolic logic approaches, initially implemented using Prolog, 
were, according to some, very suitable in law, owing to the fact that 
“the law is well documented; its provisions are written down, and 
 
 33. ALLEN HUSTLER, PROGRAMMING LAW IN LOGIC, RESEARCH REPORT CS-82-13 
(Department of Computer Science ed., 1982). 
 38. E.g., Lashbrooke, supra note 23, at 304. 
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where they are not, decisions in previous cases are recorded for future 
reference.”35 This led one group of scholars to develop the British Na-
tionality Act System—among the first efforts to translate legal reason-
ing into an expert system.36 Developed in 1986, the program formal-
ized 150 rules associated with the obtainment of British citizenship.37 
Table 1 provides a brief overview of the logic applied in the program 
and the (lay) translation of statute to logic, demonstrating how cascad-
ing rules guide a determination of entitlement to citizenship.  
Table 1. British Nationality Act Program—Sample Rules & Logic38 
Statute Sub-Rules Logic  
(1) A person born in the 
United Kingdom after 
commencement shall be  
a British citizen if at the 
time of the birth his  
father or mother is –  
(a) a British citizen; or 
(b) settled in the UK. 
[A] X acquires British Citizenship  
      by section 1.1 
A is true if [B and 
C and D and [E or 
F]] are true. [B] X is born in the UK at T (Time) 
[C] T is after commencement of the 
      Act 
[D] Y is parent of X 
[E] Y is a British citizen at T  
[F] Y is settled in the UK at T  
The use of logic programming to emulate aspects of legal reasoning 
was, at least initially, met with enthusiasm39 and following the British 
Nationality Act System, a number of other prototypes were developed 
in academia and industry in North America, the UK, and Europe.40 
Explaining the enthusiasm surrounding symbolic approaches, Hunter 
observed that these approaches were fairly easy for lawyers to under-
stand and fitted into the existing normative pedagogical framework, 
because “law schools teach law as a type of symbolic manipulation, and 
some go so far as to introduce classes on logic and argument.”41 Others 
 
 39. M. J. Sergot et al., The British Nationality Act as a Logic Program, 29 COMM. ACM 
370, 383 (1986).  
 40. Id.; Edwina Rissland, Artificial Intelligence and Law: Stepping Stones to a Model  
of Legal Reasoning, 99 YALE L.J. 1957, 1967–68 (1990) (discussing the evolution of expert 
systems and situating BNA as one of the first expert systems in law). 
 41. Id.  
 42. Kowalski, supra note 14, § 2.1.  
 43. With respect to enthusiasm, see Richard Susskind, Expert Systems in Law: A 
Jurisprudential Approach To Artificial Intelligence And Legal Reasoning, 49 MOD. L. REV. 
168, 168 (1986) [hereinafter Susskind, A Jurisprudential Approach To Artificial Intelligence 
And Legal Reasoning]; MICHIE & JOHNSTON, supra note 15, at 54. For a more critical view 
of developments at the time and afterwards, see Greenleaf, supra note 14, § 1–5; Leith, The 
Rise and Fall of the Legal Expert System, supra note 2, at 100. 
 44. Susskind, Out Of The Research Laboratory, supra note 2, at 1–8; Richard E. 
Susskind, The Latent Damage System: A Jurisprudential Analysis, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
2ND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 23, 23–24 (1989). 
 45. Dan Hunter, Looking For Law In All The Wrong Places: Legal Theory and Legal 
Neural Networks, in JURIX : THE FOUNDATION FOR LEGAL KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS (1994). 
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(notably Leith) urged caution in overstating the potential of ex-
pert/logic systems in law and underestimating the challenges.42 
Whilst logic systems such as Prolog enabled the development of AI 
software, they were considered by some to be unsuitable for knowledge 
representation.43 Further, criticism was directed at both the practical-
ity and desirability of what was derisively referred to as “mechanical 
jurisprudence”44—translating legal reasoning to mere symbol manipu-
lation,45 and the very “notion of a clear rule [of interpretation] which . . . 
[judges] can apply without further thought.”46 These criticisms arose 
from recognition that in the real world A and B take on different values, 
and A ∴ B can easily fail as a result of simplicity.47 These views sought 
to counterbalance the claims made by others that progress in the field 
was held back by an absence of legal knowledge engineers, or a lack  
of understanding of the nature of law and legal reasoning.48 Instead, 
the problems were said to stem from the fact that the law and legal 
reasoning are contested rather than settled concepts. Systematizing 
one particular model of interpretation amounts to the imposition of 
certain assumptions about the law that were not—nor are they now—
universally agreed upon.  
The real world limitations of simple deduction are easily seen in 
practice. Take for instance, the following example provided by Article 
I, Section 5, Clause 4 of the U.S. Constitution, which states, “Neither 
House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the [prior]  
Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any 
other place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.”49 This 
could be translated into a logic statement as follows:  
House of Representatives adjourns for more than three days with-
out the consent of the Senate 
∴  House of Representatives has acted unconstitutionally 
Here the conclusion follows from the premise in terms of the  
internal logic, but this logic does not illuminate what constitutes 
“[prior consent],” or “adjournment.” Further, what is simple is not  
necessarily correct; the logic statement does not explain whether 
 
 46. Philip Leith, Logic, Formal Models and Legal Reasoning, 24 JURIMETRICS J. 334, 
356 (1984); Philip Leith, Fundamental Errors in Legal Logic Programming, 29 COMPUTER  
J. 545, 545 (1986). 
 47. Thomas F. Gordon, Some Problems with Prolog as a Knowledge Representation  
Language for Legal Expert Systems, 3 INT’L REV. LAW, COMP. & TECH. 1, 52 (1987). 
 48. See Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 623 (1908). 
 49. Leith, Fundamental Errors in Legal Logic Programming, supra note 42, at 545. 
 50. Id. at 547. 
 51. Leith, Logic, Formal Models and Legal Reasoning, supra note 42, at 339. 
 52. Susskind, Out Of The Research Laboratory, supra note 2, at 2. 
 53. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 5, cl. 4. 
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“[prior] consent” is intended to qualify: (a) adjournments longer than 
three days or adjournments to another place, or (b) adjournments to 
another place that exceed three days in duration.  
Expert systems addressed these issues though processes such as 
backtracking, which allows chains of reasoning enabled rules to be 
used in a definitional manner.50 When applied in practice, this results 
in an increasingly complex set of linked rules, nudging us closer to a 
definition for each vague term and syntactical ambiguity that exists. 
However, whilst such an approach may be effective in respect of the 
vast majority of cases where definitions are settled (what Hart  
referred to as the “hardcore of standard”), those which arguably are 
less likely to support differing interpretations (whether pernicious or 
genuine), what of the “penumbra” in which interpretation is required: 
how is it that “hard cases” are handled? 51  Where the definitional  
quality of rules become exhausted, the practical limitations of this 
form of deductive reasoning, and the difficulty associated with the  
indeterminacy of language and the (often deliberate) vagueness of  
legal language are brought into focus.52  
Admittedly, these challenges have not gone ignored. The limita-
tions of deductive rules of interpretation as described above formed  
the focus of Gardner’s early work conducted at Stanford, looking at 
what happens when the rules run out, and leading her to develop a 
computational model capable of distinguishing between hard and  
easy cases.53 Developers since have also attempted to accommodate  
the non-fixed and open-texture nature of law in a range of different 
ways, including taking cues from expert judgment,54 deferring to the 
user,55 conceptual models, and fuzzy logic.56 McCarthy’s US Taxman  
 
 54. Leith, Logic, Formal Models and Legal Reasoning, supra note 42, at 351. 
 55. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 
593, 607 (1958). 
 56. Paul Conway, Syntactic Ambiguity, L. & JUST. FOUND. NSW, Mar. 14, 2002, at 35–
37. In relation to pernicious ambiguity, see Lawrence Solan, Pernicious Ambiguity in 
Contracts and Statutes, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 859, 860–63 (2004). 
 57. ANNE VON DER LIETH GARDNER, AN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE APPROACH TO LEGAL 
REASONING 14–16 (1987). 
 58. Susskind, A Jurisprudential Approach To Artificial Intelligence And Legal 
Reasoning, supra note 39, at 176. 
 59. T.J.M. Bench-Capon, Deep Models, Normative Reasoning and Legal Expert Systems, 
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2ND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND 
LAW 37, 40 (1989); Greenleaf, supra note 14, at 9. 
 60. Classical logic has it that an object is either part of a class (= 1) or not part of a class 
(= 0). Fuzzy logic avoids this demarcation, proposing that an object can be part of a class to 
a certain degree (between 0 and 1). This allows us to represent imprecise concepts and  
handle uncertain or incomplete information. Ambiguous and overlapping concepts like 
“short,” “medium,” and “long” can be represented in fuzzy logic sets, allowing us to take  
account of the lack of definitiveness of the concepts. See Trevor Bench-Capon, Neural 
Networks and Open Texture, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 4TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE  
 
 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:29 
 
44 
project, for example, “proposed a prototype-plus-deformation model for 
representing ambiguous terms. The prototype [element] stor[ed] the 
default meaning,” whilst the deformations were structured, mapped 
synonyms.57 Nevertheless, where definitions are not settled, or ambi-
guity or vagueness arises, developers find themselves having to make 
determinations about the law that may not reflect its machinations  
in the real world. Such systems must also incorporate the ancillary 
contextual or cultural knowledge that acts to inform the legal rules 
governing a situation.58  
These challenges are not unique to law. Encoding the ability of  
clinicians to perform general reasoning on the basis of previously  
unseen combinations of patient characteristics or symptoms has also 
thwarted the progress of logic systems in medicine.59 To some degree 
these issues can be avoided in law, though not without bringing new 
challenges to the fore. For example, imposing a particular interpreta-
tion can be avoided by deferring to the judgment of the user, allowing 
the user to make a call as to whether the conditions for a certain  
definition have been met. Yet, deferring to the user risks creating a 
system that conceptually maps legal reasoning, but does not perform 
it. Conversely, enshrining the expertise (and the judgment) of a lawyer 
within the system ascribes this expertise a level of definitiveness and 
authority that conflicts with the way in which expertise is brought to 
bear in reality. Lawyers advocate for an interpretation that best serves 
their client, relying on axioms (knowledge of some previous truth),  
induction, and/or deduction to justify this conclusion. Disputes arise 
because experts are able to justify competing logical interpretations, 
and therefore expert systems must do more than just provide a heuris-
tic answer. Instead, they must search the solution space to corral  
 
ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 292, 292 (1993); see also Hollatz, supra note 12, at 
289–300 (providing useful exploration of fuzzy logic in respect of German jurisprudence); 
Célia Da Costa Peia et al., Combining Fuzzy Logic and Formal Argumentation for Legal 
Interpretation, 10 in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 16TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 49, 55–58 (2017) (providing an implementation example).   
 61. Seth R. Goldman et al., Precedent-Based Legal Reasoning and Knowledge 
Acquisition in Contract Law: A Process Model, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1ST INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 210, 220 (1987) (demonstrating that in 
ascertaining whether a simple contract exists knowledge of social roles, knowledge of idioms 
and an understanding of the notion of “promise” and of the meaning of “agreement” is 
required.); L. Thorne McCarty, Reflections on TAXMAN: An Experiment in Artificial 
Intelligence and Legal Reasoning, 90 HARV. L. REV. 837, 888 (1977). 
 58. Goldman et al., supra note 57, at 211. 
 59. Peter Szolovits, Artificial Intelligence and Medicine, in ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
IN MEDICINE 16 (Peter Szolovits ed., 1982) (exemplifying this challenge with the following 
hypothetical: a doctor hears that a patient, who they know works in a feed store, is  
experiencing upper body pain; the doctor may naturally expect the pain to be caused  
by heavy-lifting while working, while an AI agent may not have access to this external  
information, or may be unable to deduce when an occupation may have a medical impact by 
hard-coded rules). 
2020] THE DEVIL IN THE DETAIL  
 
45
all possible answers and from this present an argument for each that 
undermines opposing positions and strengthens the position of the  
answer in focus.60 In this regard, law shares some of the strategic  
elements of games, such as chess; yet unlike chess, in law the range  
of possible moves and the rules governing these moves are not static 
or fixed, as the body of case law makes clear.   
2. Precedent & Case-Based Systems 
In the face of competing interpretations, it is argued that judges 
must have recourse to other forms of reasoning.61 Within an adversar-
ial system based on precedent, determining whether an A is a B also 
demands analogical/inductive logic in which opposing yet plausible 
interpretations are reconciled with reference to past cases, as follows: 
Case c1 is similar to Case c2 
Proposition p is true in case C1 
∴ p is true in c2.  
In order to automate comparative and analogical reasoning  
processes, a system must operationalize the concept of “similarity  
between cases”—determining whether a case fits within a particular 
class by exploring the factors (key issues) on which a decision of  
similarity is said to turn. It is not just the existence of similarity of 
factors, but the polarity (favoring a plaintiff/favoring a defendant) of 
factors that matter.62 Similarity speaks to individual factors, as well 
as to case outcomes as a whole. The following example helps illustrate 
the point. 
In U.S. Trademark Law, “consumer confusion” represents a central 
consideration for the court in determining whether trademark in-
fringement has occurred.63 In establishing whether “consumer confu-
sion” exists or is likely to arise, a district court must conduct a  
multifactor analysis based on the factors set out by that circuit.  
According to the Seventh Circuit, the multifactor test is intended “as 
a heuristic device to assist in determining whether confusion exists.”64 
 
 60. KEVIN D. ASHLEY, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LEGAL ANALYTICS: NEW TOOLS 
FOR LAW PRACTICE IN THE DIGITAL AGE 3 (2017). 
 61. Leith, Logic, Formal Models and Legal Reasoning, supra note 2, 352–56 (discussing 
the relevance of inductive and analogical reasoning); Leith, The Rise and Fall of the Legal 
Expert System, supra note 2, at 101–03. 
 62. Id. at 76. 
 63. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark 
Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1582 (2006) ("The overriding question in most federal 
trademark infringement litigation is a simple one: is the defendant’s trademark, because of 
its similarity to the plaintiff’s trademark, causing or likely to cause consumer confusion as 
to the true source of the defendant’s goods?"). 
 64. Sullivan v. CBS Corp., 385 F.3d 772, 778 (7th Cir. 2004). 
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Each circuit has gone on to adumbrate its own formulation of the test, 
so whilst the Federal Circuit draws on thirteen factors, other circuits, 
such as the Second, use only eight. 65  In determining whether the  
defendant's trademark is causing or likely to cause consumer confu-
sion as to the true source of the defendant's goods, the Second Circuit 
has identified eight factors of importance:66  
• The Strength of the Plaintiff's Mark (F1); 
• The Similarity of Plaintiff's and Defendant's Marks (F2); 
• The Proximity of Plaintiff's and Defendant's Products (F3); 
• The Likelihood That One of the Parties Will Bridge the Gap 
(F4); 
• Evidence of Actual Confusion (F5); 
• Defendant's Intent (F6); 
• The Quality of Defendant's Goods (F7); 
• The Sophistication of the Consumers (F8). 
Courts have also advised that the correct approach to analyzing 
these variables and likelihood of confusion as a whole is to adopt a 
“global appreciation” of all relevant factors and the contribution  
they might make to confusion, treating them as interdependent in  
the sense that a lesser degree of similarity of one factor may be  
compensated for by a greater degree of similarity of the other(s).67 This 
permits analysis in respect of outcomes for individual factors, and 
analysis in respect of the case outcome as a whole.  
Firstly, it is possible to analogize between cases on the basis of  
the specific sub-factors (e.g., F1–F8) to deduce what has led to a  
conclusion of confusion in previous cases and what that might mean  
in the context of a new dispute. However, this is more complex  
than might be assumed. That courts have previously found that  
the marks “PROZAC” and “HERBROZAC”68 demonstrate similarity, 
but that “POLAROID” and “POLARAD” 69  do not demonstrate 
 
 65. Beebe, supra note 63, at 1582–83 (citing Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 
F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961)). 
 66. Polarad, 287 F.2d at 495. 
 67. See, e.g., Thane Int’l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2002); 
Scott Fetzer Co. v. House of Vacuums Inc., 381 F.3d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 2004); Shakespeare 
Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am. Inc., 110 F.3d 234, 242 (4th Cir. 1997); Soc’y of Fin. Exam’rs v. 
Nat’l Ass’n of Certified Fraud Exam’rs Inc., 41 F.3d 223, 228 n.15 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 68. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 469 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 69. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961). 
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similarity, suggests that a finding of similarity of marks is not merely 
a matter of the linguistic “edit distance” between the marks.70  
It is then also possible to ascertain how the combination of factors 
(F1–F8) contribute to the overall outcome. However, the factors are  
interdependent and do not contribute an equal weight to an overall 
finding in favor of the Plaintiff (P) or Defendant (D). That is to say that 
a strong finding in favor of a plaintiff with respect to one factor may 
compensate for the fact that many other factors were found in favor of 
the defendant. Outcomes are not cumulative, nor have lawyers been 
said to think in this way. As Ashley and Rissland explain: “Experts in 
domains like the law simply do not reason in terms of weighting 
schemes. In fact[,] in the legal domain, any reasoner that based an 
opinion or course of action upon a purely numerical scheme would be 
highly suspect.”71 
As a result, it is not possible to conclude that a case win is simply 
the product of more factors being found in favor of the plaintiff then 
being found in favor of the defendant. Analogizing between cases may 
instead mean exploring overlaps between cases on the basis of factors, 
as shown in Figure 2 below.  
Figure 2. Likelihood of Confusion (F1–F8)  
Factor Overlap for Three Second Circuit Likelihood of Confusion Cases. 
 
 70. A measure of difference computed with reference to the number of operations  
required to transform one word into another. See DANIEL JURAFSKY & JAMES H. MARTIN, 
SPEECH AND LANGUAGE PROCESSING § 3.11 (2d ed. 2009). 
 71. Kevin D. Ashley & Edwina L. Rissland, Waiting on Weighting: A Symbolic Least 
Commitment Approach, in AAAI PROCEEDINGS 239, 239 (1988). 
 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:29 
 
48 
Figure 272 draws together overlaps between three cases decided in 
the Southern District of New York in accordance with Second Circuit 
precedent: Playtex Products v. Georgia-Pacific Inc.,73 Madison Avenue 
Caviarteria, Inc. v. Caviaria.com, 74  and Best Cellars Inc. v. Grape 
Finds at Dupont, Inc.75 It reveals most obviously in regards to Playtex 
Products, that decisions are not made simply by counting the number 
of factors that favor the Defendant or the Plaintiff.76 The Playtex Prod-
ucts decision shares a number of factor outcomes in common with both 
Madison and Best Cellars where a finding of “consumer confusion” was 
found (P). That factors F1 and F3 overlap with both Madison and Best 
Cellars might give a lawyer scope to argue that the case has more in 
common with those where likelihood of “consumer confusion” has been 
found. Conversely, the fact that Playtex Products shares F8 and F4 with 
only Best Cellars and both Madison and Best Cellars share decisions 
of F2 and F5 in favor of the Plaintiff whereas Playtex Products does not, 
gives a lawyer room to argue that the case is sufficiently different from 
those in which the Plaintiff has won. 
Case-based reasoning addresses the notion of legal decision making 
as analogical, ordinal, and top-down. Outcomes in key cases heard  
in higher courts, (in principle) bind determinations in lower courts.  
For this reason, analogizing or distinguishing between the facts of a 
current case and that of the leading cases replicates the way in which 
cases are argued in court. This approach has led to the production of  
a number of systems, including HYPO (on which the methodology  
conveyed in Figure 2 is based), which compares sets of overlapping  
dimensions between cases with respect to U.S. Trade Secret Law.77  
It has also led to probabilistic variations on the aforementioned  
case-based and rule-based approaches, as exemplified by the Shyster 
program developed in Australia.78  
Nevertheless, in practice, such systems are of questionable utility. 
Similarities between cases are likely to be well known to domain  
 
 72. For the purposes of simplifying this example, the following explanation ignores the 
order (year) in which the cases were decided, although it is recognized that this will inevita-
bly have an impact upon comparability between cases/factors. 
 73. Playtex Prods., Inc. v. Ga-Pac. Corp., No. 02 Civ. 7838(HB), 2003 WL 21929706 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2003). 
 74. Madison Ave. Caviarteria, Inc. v. Caviaria.com, No. 04 Civ. 00493 RO, 2004 WL 
744481 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2004). 
 75. Best Cellars, Inc. v. Grape Finds at Dupont, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 431 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000). 
 76. Playtex Prods., 2003 WL 21929706, at *3–6. 
 77. Edwina L. Rissland & Kevin D. Ashley, A Case-Based System for Trade Secrets Law, 
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1ST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE  
AND LAW 60, 61–63 (1987); Stefanie Brüninghaus & Kevin D. Ashley, Generating Legal 
Arguments and Predictions from case Texts, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 10TH INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 65, 67–69 (2005). 
 78. See generally JAMES POPPLE, A PRAGMATIC LEGAL EXPERT SYSTEM (1996). 
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experts, and not easily understandable to lay users.79 Whilst these  
systems prompt compelling intellectual questions about the nature of 
legal reasoning, their broader commercial value is unclear. Further-
more, case-based reasoning relies on the presumption of consistency 
and the view that differences in case outcomes derive from the nuances 
of reasoning. That decisions ought to be based on deductive or analog-
ical reasoning is not to say that they are, even if outwardly this  
appears to be the case.80 The easiest way to avoid being committed to 
deductive rules alleged to prevail in an instance where “if P then Q” 
would ordinarily apply, is to determine that the facts do not permit a 
determination of P. This amounts to a Wittgensteinian re-writing of 
the rules such that “no course of action could be determined by a rule, 
because every course of action can be made out to accord with the 
rule.”81 But if reasoning by deduction or analogy does not account for 
the interpretive process, what does? 
3. Discretion: Modeling Inputs & Outputs 
The formalist view that judges interpret rather than make law  
demands that any reasoning must stem from a plain reading of  
relevant legislation, legal codes, and the case law rules of common law 
and equity derived from previous judgements. Constraining inputs to 
a specific range of sources operates to restrict a judge from projecting 
his or her own opinions, values, or beliefs onto the process of decision-
making. Thus, in theory, the positivist/formalist system of law is a 
closed system in which new legal interpretations are grounded in and 
arise from existing interpretations. However, if the existing legal  
material is indeterminate because it can always be interpreted in  
conflicting and contradictory ways, what drives the decision to adopt 
one interpretation over another?  
On this view, legal interpretation becomes less a form of bounded 
reasoning (of the deductive/analogical variety) and more a process  
of subjective political decision-making. This arguably casts doubt on 
the idea that the law is a closed system, or that judges are as textual 
as formalists suggest. That judges profess to be following rules or  
precedent does not guarantee that this is the case. There may be other 
types of reasoning that influence a decision, even if (by virtue of  
 
 79. Perhaps explaining why some systems were originally designed to assist law  
students in learning the basics of legal reasoning, for example, Ashley and Aleven’s CATO 
program. ASHLEY, supra note 60, at 3; Vincent Aleven & Kevin D. Ashley, Evaluating a 
Learning Environment for Case-Based Argumentation Skills, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 6TH 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 170, 174 (1997). 
 80. See Beebe, supra note 63, at 1583–85 (discussing this in the context of trademark 
law). 
 81. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 201 (G.E.M. Anscombe 
trans., 3d ed. 1986). The relevance of this paradox in this context has also been noted by 
Leith, Logic, Formal Models and Legal Reasoning, supra note 42, at 340. 
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convention in which judges feel compelled to be seen to be following 
the deductive or analogical “rules”) this reasoning does not appear  
in the ratio decidendi.82  Hence, from a realist perspective, judicial  
interpretation amounts to the creation of law because it is only via  
interpretation that legal meaning is formally settled. Judicial discre-
tion, when coupled with the indeterminacy of law, provides scope for 
reasoning to be influenced by a range of extra-systematic factors,  
including (but not limited to): (i) the purpose of the law/intent of  
legislators, (ii) fairness of outcome, 83  and (iii) the broader social/ 
policy/political/economic/legal impact of the decision. 84  
On this view, the inevitable subjectivity of judicial interpretation 
can only be revealed through the quantitative or qualitative study  
of case outcomes in which a broad range of potential influences are 
tested. This testing may involve qualitative techniques (e.g., textual 
analysis that looks within decisions for evidence of motivations and 
considerations that go beyond the prevailing logical or functional  
criteria ordinarily applied), though it is more commonly associated 
with quantitative techniques, notably the use of descriptive and infer-
ential statistics, and more recently, analysis via ML. These methods 
provide a way of testing the relationship between case inputs and case 
outcomes, producing evidence to counter the view that the process of 
interpretation is “scientific” in nature.  
The application of these methods to legal decision-making in order 
to test the validity of theoretical propositions reveals the influence  
of a wide range of extraneous factors on judicial decision-making.  
One such influence is mental fatigue, with research proposing that 
successive decision-making taxes an individual’s executive function 
and mental resources, increasing the tendency to simplify decisions  
by accepting the status quo.85 In the case of repeated judgments or  
decisions this may explain the increased similarity of decisions 86  
and the increased reliance on intuitive decision-making87 previously 
observed. Other research has documented more obscure influences,  
 
 82. See generally Beebe, supra note 53; William E. Boyd, Law in Computers and 
Computers in Law: Lawyer’s View of the State of the Art, 14 ARIZ. L. REV. 267, 284–85 (1972). 
 83. MacCormick termed this “Everyday Logic” to mean “that which makes sense”  
primarily because, in contrast to formal logic, everyday logic aligns with patterns of individ-
ual and social belief that give rise to expectations of normative behavior. See NEIL 
MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY ii (2003). 
 84. See supra note 82. 
 85. Mark Muraven & Roy F. Baumeister, Self-Regulation and Depletion of Limited 
Resources: Does Self-Control Resemble a Muscle?, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 247, 247–48 (2000). 
 86. See, e.g., Shai Danziger et al., Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions, 108 PROC. 
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. 6889, 6890 (2011) (discussing a relationship between the order of a 
parole decision (before or after a food break) and the favorability of the decision to an appli-
cant). 
 87. Anastasiya Pocheptsova et al., Deciding Without Resources: Resource Depletion and 
Choice in Context, 46 J. MKT. RES. 344, 353 (2009). 
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including correlations between the weather, current affairs, and case 
outcomes in asylum seeker status adjudications. 88  Whilst certain  
personal characteristics, including the political bias,89 ethnicity, age, 
gender, and educational background of judges have been shown to  
predict judicial decisions in other studies, perhaps explaining why  
appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court are so contentious. 90  
Modeling law using statistical methods, such as regression analysis, 
involves reducing a particular outcome (for example: a legal decision, 
the likelihood of litigation, a settlement amount, or the time taken to 
progress through court) to a mathematical function. A hypothetical  
example helps illustrate the point. Assume that we have in our pos-
session a large number of case files on clinical (professional) negligence 
claims. Insurers are required to record potential settlement or court-
awarded amounts as liabilities on corporate accounting records, and 
lawyers to whom this estimation task may be assigned are judged on 
accuracy of their assessments. Experienced lawyers commonly review 
case files and suggest an appropriate financial figure that they believe 
the court would produce and then calculate from this the amount likely 
to encourage a claimant to settle rather than to pursue litigation. They 
draw on professional experience to inform these calculations but these 
subjective (albeit informed) predictions are not always accurate, nor 
does accuracy necessarily increase alongside experience.91  
Although this process of reasoning is not well understood, it is not 
unthinkable that case features/characteristics seen by lawyers as rel-
evant in informing a settlement/judgement figure could be articulated 
and encoded in a symbolic, rules-based system. Yet this would explain 
only one lawyer’s perceptions of relevance, and would not account for 
actual values recorded, values that may be the product of several  
negotiations rather than the acceptance of a first offer. There is benefit 
in standardizing the approach taken to predict settlement amounts, 
by modeling the data in our case files to quantitatively explore the  
relationship between various case features (variables) and outcome 
amount. The same would also be true of variations on our hypothetical  
 
 
 88. Daniel L. Chen & Jess Eagel, Can Machine Learning Help Predict the Outcome of 
Asylum Adjudications?, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 16TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 237, 238 (2016). 
 89. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 150 (2006) (discussing the empirical evidence supporting politi-
cized judicial decision-making).  
 90. See, e.g., Justin D. Levinson et al., Judging Implicit Bias: A National Empirical 
Study of Judicial Sterotypes, 69 FLA. L. REV. 63, 68–69 (2017); David S. Abrams et. al., Do 
Judges Vary in their Treatment of Race?, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 347, 350 (2012); Thomas J. Miles 
& Cass R. Sustein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHIC. L. REV. 761, 765 
(2008).  
 91. Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 22, at 1346–47.  
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if we were dealing with other forms of legal decision-making, such  
as winning a case, evaluating parole risk, and/or calculating other 
damages.  
In our insurance hypothetical, descriptive statistics help us identify 
(among other things) how many cases go to court, how many settle at 
first offer, and/or the number of cases in which the initial settlement 
amount is substantially different from the final settlement amount. 
Inferential statistics involves deriving underlying probability distribu-
tions that may help assess differences between groups/test hypotheses 
or make estimates. This allows us to extrapolate inferences beyond our 
sample; to examine whether certain case or claimant features (e.g., age 
of claimant, postcode, type of injury) are associated with higher/lower 
settlement amounts, and to determine how confident (probabilistically 
speaking) we should be in concluding that these patterns indicate a 
real relationship rather than mere coincidence. Assuming our sample 
is representative, the relationships revealed in our analysis can be 
generalized beyond the cases we have examined. It is also possible to 
link the inputs to the outputs, so as to determine the size of effect gen-
erated by different model parameters (variables/features). That is, to 
examine the effect of claimant postcode or income on settlement 
amount, as compared to the effect of injury type of settlement amount. 
Doing so helps to reveal the features (variables) that are really driving 
settlement outcomes. 
The scientific model of inquiry on which the statistical model rests, 
requires an analysis to be directed towards testing a particular hy-
pothesis. In order to predict settlement amounts, we need an idea of 
the variables/features of a case that we believe to be driving settlement 
figures, and these go on to form the basis of our hypothesis. However, 
if the interpretation of law is as inchoate a process as the preceding 
analysis and the competing explanations of legal reasoning  
suggest, we may not have a clear idea of the causes producing an  
effect. This circumstance calls for ML approaches, as these require  
no hypothesis testing or preconceived theory.92 Rather than testing  
select factors, ML models (which typically rely on vastly larger  
datasets than that used for hypothesis-driven quantitative work, with 
a far larger number of variables), effectively take the process of  
inference one step back.93 Through the ingest of testing and training 
data, and the mapping of inputs to outputs, only those features  
(variables) shown to significantly contribute to an outcome (or to  
the accuracy of predicting the right outcome when comparing  
testing/training material) are included. These features inform the 
 
 92. See e.g., Lyria Bennett-Moses & Janet Chan, Using Big Data for Legal and Law 
Enforcement Decisions Testing the New Tools, 37 UNSW L.J., 643, 648 (2014). 
 93. Id. 
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development of a post-hoc explanatory theory,94 though the rational 
construction of such a theory may prove difficult, for reasons discussed 
further below.  
ML methods (all of which have a statistical genesis and many of 
which are employed in hypothesis testing approaches as well) are dis-
tinguished based on their learning style.95 Supervised or unsupervised 
are the most prominent paradigms, though there are many methods 
that fall outside this dichotomy (e.g., reinforcement learning) or which 
take elements from both (e.g., semi-supervised methods).96 Supervised 
learning methods are intended to produce predictions in respect of un-
seen data points (e.g., cases where the case features are known but the 
outcome is not) by mapping existing data.97 They associate a set of in-
puts (factors) with another set of outputs (often termed labels), with 
the implication being that some human effort is required to  
establish and connect to the inputs. 98  Unsupervised learning is  
more often focused on finding patterns within sets of data and attempt-
ing to attach a meaning to these patterns a posteriori, for example,  
clustering claimants based on their age, profession, income and loca-
tion, assuming they must share other similarities, and consequently 
grouping them together for the purposes of litigation strategy.99   
Both supervised and unsupervised approaches to ML, as well as  
hybrid (semi-supervised) approaches, have been employed in the  
academic setting. Chen and Eagel used supervised learning to create 
a model to predict the outcome of U.S. asylum adjudications using a 
set of input data.100 Wongchaisuwat’s U.S. Litigation Model identified 
factors capable of predicting whether a patent is likely to be litigated 
against and when this might happen, employing methods from both 
the supervised learning domain (using an ensemble (voting) classifica-
tion method) in conjunction with a clustering (unsupervised learning) 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. See generally KEVIN P. MURPHY, MACHINE LEARNING: A PROBABILISTIC 
PERSPECTIVE (2012). 
 96. See e.g., RICHARD SUTTON & ANDREW G. BARTO, REINFORCEMENT LEARNING: AN 
INTRODUCTION (2018). 
 97. CHRISTOPHER M. BISHOP, PATTERN RECOGNITION AND MACHINE LEARNING (2006). 
 98. These labels can be real valued numbers (e.g., a dollar value when attempting to 
predict a likely settlement amount) or categories (e.g., whether a claimant is likely to: accept 
first settlement offer, accept later settlement offer, or refuse to settle). Murphy, supra note 
95. 
 99. For an example of some methods for classification and analysis of multivariate  
observations, see J. MacQueen, Some Methods for Classification and Analysis of Multivari-
ate Observations, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH BERKELEY SYMPOSIUM ON MATHEMATICAL 
STATISTICS AND PROBABILITY 281–297 (1967). 
 100. Chen & Eagel, supra note 88, at 238. 
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method to improve performance.101 Whilst Bochereau employed a ca-
nonical supervised learning method to ascertain whether the Conseil 
d'Etat would annul or confirm a bylaw on the basis of input variables 
relating to regulations, bylaws, factual, and normative standards.102  
Whilst the range of problems to which ML has been applied in law 
has varied, common to all implementations irrespective of subject  
matter is the need for quality data. Input data for ML can take many 
different forms, drawing from the settlement example above, this 
might include real valued numerical (scale), categorical, or nominal 
data. Whilst complex linguistic or semantic constructs can be simpli-
fied for the purpose of analysis (e.g., recording the severity of claimant 
injury as a point on a scale of 1 (minor) to 10 (severe)), there may be 
some work required to get to data into this format. This is because  
data must be “structured” in a way that allows for its inclusion in  
statistical/machine learning models, necessitating organization in  
the form of columns and rows (or equivalent).103  This requirement  
produces certain challenges in law where much of the data used is  
“unstructured,” taking the form of natural language.  
For this reason, recent advances in Natural Language Processing 
(NLP) (the computational processing or “structuring” of language 
drawing on rule-based, statistical, and ML techniques), which have 
enabled text-based information to be incorporated into the ML/ 
statistical modeling process, are of clear significance for fields  
such as law. NLP uses data-driven and rule-based techniques to  
translate linguistic meaning into numerical meaning. 104  One such 
 
 101. Papis Wongchaisuwat et al., Predicting Litigation Likelihood and Time to Litigation 
for Patents, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 16TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 257, 257 (2017). 
 102. Laurent Bochereau et al., Extracting Legal Knowledge by Means of a Multilayer 
Neural Network Application to Municipal Jurisprudence, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 288, 290 (1991). 
 103. For example, SQL data commonly takes the form of relational tables, whereas non-
SQL data, which is often scripted as JSON, does not present with the traditional column and 
row format, though nonetheless, it is still capable of assuming that form. 
 104. See generally Julie Beth Lovins, Development of a Stemming Algorithm, 
MECHANICAL TRANSLATION AND COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS 22–31 (1968). Rule-based 
methods have fallen out of fashion for achieving complex tasks (e.g., detecting sentiment 
from text), but are still commonly used during pre-processing. For example, using a stem-
ming algorithm, to ‘undo the rules’ that allow for all words in a body of text to be reduced to 
their roots (e.g., ‘walking’ is mapped to ‘walk’, ‘willingness’ is mapped to ‘will’), so as to gain 
topic insight. Mitchell Marcus et al., Building a large annotated corpus of English: The Penn 
Treebank, UNIV. PA. SCHOLARLY COMMONS, Oct. 1993; William Schuler et al., Broad-Cover-
age Parsing Using Human-Like Memory Constraints, 36 COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS 1, 
313–330 (2010). Similarly, grammatical rules may be hand-crafted by a linguistic expert, 
Eric Brill, A Simple Rule-Based Part of Speech Trigger, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD 
CONFERENCE ON APPLIED NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING, 152–55 (1992), with the goal of 
performing ‘part-of-speech’ (POS) tagging where each word in a text is assigned a label de-
noting its grammatical role (noun, verb, adverb et cetera). See Table 2 in Laura Chiticariu 
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implementation of NLP is feature extraction, which identifies and  
extracts key content from written materials. For example, when using 
summaries of a patient’s discharge reports to deduce a measure of  
severity of injury, having a feature that reflects the presence of the 
words “induced coma” might be a good indicator of whether the patient 
suffered extensive trauma.105 More complex word embedding methods 
use (unsupervised) ML to quantify the context of a word based on  
the surrounding text, with semantically similar words assigned  
mathematically “close” values-in vector space. 106  This consistency  
allows for mathematical manipulation (Berlin - Germany + France  
is approximately equal to Paris107 and King - Man + Woman is approx-
imately equal to Queen 108 ) and can be expanded to incorporate  
sentences. 
These and more complex NLP techniques, such as deep learning, 
have been used in a range of legal tasks associated with the process  
 
et al., Rule-based Information Extraction is Dead! Long Live Rule-based Information Extrac-
tion Systems!, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2013 CONFERENCE ON EMPIRICAL METHODS IN 
NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING 827, 829 (2013). However, specification of the rules may 
be time-consuming and requires dependence on expert linguists. It can also give rise to the 
potential for a high level of inter-annotator disagreement which operates to reduce scalabil-
ity, whilst irregularities in language are difficult to address and not uncommon. Dat Quoc  
& Son Bao Pham, Ripple Down Rules for Question Answering, SEMANTIC WEB (2015), 
http://www.semantic-web-journal.net/content/ripple-down-rules-question-answering-0 
[https://perma.cc/2SSD-8XHG]. Further, large numbers of rules may be used to capture such 
irregularities, but interactions between rules may cause complications. CHRISTOPHER D. 
MANNING, INTRODUCTION TO INFORMATION RETRIEVAL 293–320 (2008). In contrast, ML-
based NLP does not require the same level of manual tuning; instead one hopes that the 
training data is sufficient, and the model employed is apt to capture the relevant linguistic 
rules. Nonetheless, rule-based feature engineering remains in use for some ML modelling 
algorithms. 
 105. Note that while feature engineering often uses simple rules, (“is the phrase ‘induced 
coma’ present in the text?”), the output of this rule is not the final output we are interested 
in (the patient’s severity of injury), but forms an input to an ML model, which predicts  
the final output. This example was modified from a hypertension example provided in Vijay 
N. Garla & Cynthia Brandt, Ontology-Guided Feature Engineering for Clinical Text 
Classification, 45 J. BIOMED. INFORMMATICS 992, 995–98 (2012). 
 106. See Miguel Kakanakou, Build and Visualize Word2Vec Model on Amazon Reviews, 
BEEXPERT (Sept. 10, 2017), http://migsena.com/build-and-visualize-word2vec-model- 
on-amazon-reviews/; Christian S. Perone, Voynich Manuscript: Word Vectors and  
t-SNE Visualization of Some Patterns, TERRA ICOGNITA (Jan. 16, 2016), http://blog. 
christianperone.com/2016/01/voynich-manuscript-word-vectors-and-t-sne-visualization-of-
some-patterns/ [https://perma.cc/ABQ9-UWYY]; Kaspar Beelen, Visualizing Parliamentary 
Discourse with Word2Vec and Gephi, ON HISTORY (Aug. 5, 2015), https://blog.history.ac. 
uk/2015/08/visualizing-parliamentary-discourse-with-word2vec-and-gephi/ [https://perma. 
cc/C3BB-HXFA].  
 107. Tomas Mikolov et al., Distributed Representations of Words and Phrases and their 
Compositionality, in 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 26TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON NEURAL 
INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS 3111, 3115 (2013). 
 108. Ekaterina Vylomova et al., Take and Took, Gaggle and Goose, Book and Read: 
Evaluating the Utility of Vector Differences for Lexical Relation Learning, in PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE 54TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS 1671, 
1671 (2016). 
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of legal interpretation: to predict whether a new bill will become law,109 
to accelerate legal review tasks,110 to identify deontic modalities in fi-
nancial regulations,111 to facilitate an originalist interpretation of legal 
language,112 to improve the readability of legislative sentences,113 to 
create question and answer dialogues enabling naturalist interroga-
tion of Supreme Court decisions,114 to automate text summarization,115 
to derive legal knowledge116 and argument schematics117 from legal 
texts, to quantify latent and manifest linguistic similarities between 
legal documents,118 and to automate the review of national legislation 
to identify implementation of European Union (EU) directives.119  
Using the aforementioned NLP techniques to structure data and 
ML techniques to expose correlations between different variables and 
outcomes, it is possible to test the objectivity of judicial decision-
 
 109. John J. Nay, Predicting and Understanding Law-Making with Word Vectors and an 
Ensemble Model, 12 PLO ONE, May 10, 2017, at 12. 
 110. Ngoc Phuoc An Vo et al., Experimenting Word Embeddings in Assisting Legal 
Review, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 16TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 189, 192 (2017). 
 111. Paul Buitelaar et al., Classifying Sentential Modality in Legal Language: a use Case 
in Financial Regulations, Acts and Directives, 10 in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 16TH 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 159, 159 (2017). 
 112. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan & Tammy Gales, Corpus Linguistics as a Tool in Legal 
Interpretation, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1311, 1312–13 (2017); Lee J. Strang, How Big Data Can 
Increase Originalism’s Methodological Rigor: Using Corpus Linguistics to Reveal Original 
Language Conventions, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1181, 1212–23 (2017); Nathan Kozuskanich, 
Originalism, History, and the Second Amendment: What Did Bearing Arms Really Mean to 
the Founders?, 10 J. CONST. L. 413, 415–16 (2008). 
 113. See, e.g., Michael Curtotti et al., Machine Learning for Readability of Legislative 
Sentences, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 15TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 53, 53 (2015); L. Karl Branting et al., Automated Drafting of Self-
Explaining Documents, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 6TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 72, 72 (1997). 
 114. Jose Gabriel Lopes et al., Question/Answer Dialogues for Interfacing a Database 
with Supreme Court Decisions, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 6TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 
ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 255, 255 (1997). 
 115. Claire Grover et al., Automatic Summarisation of Legal Documents, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 9TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND 
LAW 243, 243 (2003); Ben Hachey & Claire Grover, Automatic Legal Text Summarisation: 
Experiments with Summary Structuring, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 10TH INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 75, 77 (2005). 
 116. Vassilis Konstantinou et al., Can Legal Knowledge be Derived from Legal Texts?, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 4TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND 
LAW 218, 224 (1993). 
 121. Katarzyna Budzynska & Serena Villata, Argument Mining, 17 IEEE INTELL. 
INFORMATICS BULL. 1, 1–2 (2016). 
 118. Erich Schweighofer et al., Information Filtering: The Computation of Similarities 
in Large Corpora of Legal Texts, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 5TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 
ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 119, 119 (1995). 
 119. Rohan Nanda et al., A Unifying Similarity Measure for Automated Identification of 
National Implementations of European Union Directives, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 16TH 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 149, 150 (2017). 
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making, and to expose subjective, circumstantial, or ostensibly  
irrelevant factors influencing legal outcomes. However, whilst this 
type of quantitative analysis is intended to inform legal reasoning,  
it is not always credited with this accomplishment. Quantitative em-
pirical methods of understanding decision-making or interpretation 
(linguistic or otherwise) have attracted criticism for failing to illumi-
nate certain aspects of legal reasoning. 120  To those who approach  
legal reasoning from a different theoretical position, such findings  
may be discounted as entirely obvious, and the value they add in  
systematically validating what to some is “obvious,” is often overlooked. 
Conversely, findings may be viewed as counter-intuitive and nonsen-
sical—not just because they contradict widely held views as to the  
objective and logical nature of legal reasoning.  
Variables are included in a hypothesis-led model because existing 
theories drawn from law or related fields suggest a relationship  
between that input and output. As such, where a relationship is shown 
to exist, the reasoning underpinning the theory serves as the starting 
point by which to explain the actuality. However, the bigger the avail-
able data, the greater risk of severing the theory-data connection,121 
particularly when employing ML techniques in which variable  
selection is not theory-led. This may see certain variables enhance  
predictive accuracy even though such variables do not enhance our  
understanding of judicial decision-making.122   
Issues translating quantitative findings in a legally meaningful 
way are magnified where the relationship between inputs and outputs 
is not just difficult to explain but also difficult to disentangle, as is 
often the case when using Big Data or NLP and drawing on thousands 
of variables/features. Claims that the hugely complex black box models 
produced in ML are of limited utility in respect of understanding  
phenomena are not unique to legal decision-making: the Defense  
Advanced Research Policy Agency (DARPA) has created a research 
 
 120. See Ashley & Rissland, supra note 60, at 240; Ashley, supra note 64, at 100 (dis-
cussing the Hypo system, Ashley reports that “legal factor weights are sensitive to the par-
ticular context . . . judges and attorneys do not argue about the weight of legal factors in 
quantitative terms . . . legal domain experts do not agree what the weights are, and combin-
ing positive and negative weights numerically obscures the need for arguing about the reso-
lution of competing legal factors”). 
 121. OSONDE OSOBA & WILLIAM WELSER IV, AN INTELLIGENCE IN OUR IMAGE: THE RISKS 
OF BIAS AND ERRORS IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 17–18 (2017); OSONDE A. OSOBA & PAUL 
K. DAVIS, An Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning Perspective on Social Simulation New 
Data and New Challenges 11 (DARPA, Working Paper No. 1213, 2018). 
 122. Chen and Eagel’s paper operates as a case in point, with their predictive model able 
to correctly classify 82% of cases on the basis of a mix of variables, including case factors, 
judge factors, the weather, and the news cycle. See Chen & Eagel, supra note 71, at 238. 
Whilst incorporating weather in the model enhances its predictive accuracy, weather is not 
an obvious influence on judicial behavior and serves only to confuse rather than enhance an 
understanding of judicial decision-making. Id.  
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group called Explainable Artificial Intelligence123 with interpretability 
as its key focus.124 For this reason, models, which clearly articulate 
how important each input is in decision-making, are favored over those 
where the model internals are so complicated that this information is 
not retrievable. 125  However, there are circumstances in which the  
features relied on by an ML algorithm will be of secondary interest.  
If, for example, the sole function of an ML algorithm is to classify  
cases into group A or B, then assuming the ML algorithm replicates 
human classification with sufficient precision (by drawing on a set  
of human-annotated A and B cases), addressing the theory-data  
gap may be unnecessary.126 Nevertheless, acknowledging and under-
standing these issues at the outset is critical and this importance is 
magnified as natural language processing is used to yield increasingly 
complex models.  
As the preceding section makes clear, it is possible (albeit with some 
caveats) to represent hypothetical and actual judicial interpretation 
and decision-making as a function of cascading rules, overlapping 
precedent, and/or the influence of subjective bias represented by  
statistical patterns in data. The examples discussed above highlight 
the methods for doing so. Yet whilst most scholarship in the field of  
AI and law has focused on “black letter law”—that is, “the basic  
principles of law generally accepted by the courts and/or embodied  
in the statutes of a particular jurisdiction,”127 this is only one part of 
the AI and law picture. The embodiment of law in AI systems extends 
beyond judicial interpretation, encompassing both the bargains struck 
between private parties and the public and private enforcement  
governing those bargains, as the following section reveals.  
B.   Private Bargaining & Transacting 
Within the framework of the law, individuals have autonomy to  
engage in private ordering of disputes, creating, interpreting, and  
enforcing their own permutations of “law,” and rights/responsibilities 
through bargaining and agreement. Private bargaining and 
 
 123. See generally David Gunning, Explainable Artificial Intelligence Program Update 
November 2017, DARPA/120 (2017), https://www.darpa.mil/attachments/XAIProgram 
Update.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MSN-LXSR]. 
 124. Matt Turek, Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI), DEFENSE ADVANCED 
RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY, https://www.darpa.mil/program/explainable-artificial- 
intelligence [https://perma.cc/X7QC-HJ5A].  
 125. Gunning, supra note 123. 
 126. Osobra and Davis, supra note 117, at iii (The theory-data gap refers to the “mis-
match between measurable data streams and meaningful explanatory theories to frame the 
data.”). 
 127. John Zeleznikow et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law–Using Utility 
Functions to Support Legal Negotiation, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 11TH INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 237, 237 (2007). 
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transacting have given rise to two key inter-related manifestations of 
AI: (1) tools designed to reduce the transaction costs of bargaining, and 
(2) tools to simulate the process of bargaining itself.  
1. Reducing Bargaining Transaction Costs 
The private ordering (or application of law) between parties is  
motivated by a common goal—pursuing agreement as to a transaction 
or exchange. This agreement is reached (or not) by bargaining,  
incentivized by utility 128  gain for both parties, and formalized via  
some official or unofficial means (e.g., written contract, handshake, 
verbal agreement, performance). As with legislation and case law,  
the rights and responsibilities that derive from a private agreement 
are also subject to interpretation; occasionally by a judge in the context 
of a dispute, but more often by the parties themselves in the process  
of bargaining, and for the purpose of informing estimates regarding 
the utility of an agreement. This interpretation may be influenced  
by cultural, social, or community expectations in a way that reveals a 
normative basis to law.129 It may also be influenced by presumptions 
about other legal sources, what they are seen to protect/enforce, and 
what they might conceivably demand of a party in the event of  
non-performance. These perceptions are learned in a social context130 
which gives rise to the potential for misperception and misalignment 
between parties. Indeed, the possibility of conflict between parties  
as to interpretation is not so remote given that “the vast majority of  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 128. Utility is used here in an economic sense to describe the usefulness of the transac-
tion/outcome of the transaction.  
 129. See Pascoe Pleasence et al., Wrong About Rights: Public Knowledge of Key Areas of 
Consumer, Housing and Employment Law in England and Wales, 80 MOD. L. REV. 836, 839 
(2017) (for a broad discussion of influences); see also ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT 
LAW:  HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 115 (1991) (exploring how social norms may dis-
place formal sources of law); Janice F. Dyer & Conner Bailey, A Place to Call Home: Cultural 
Understandings of Heir Property among Rural African Americans, 73 RURAL SOC. 317, 317–
18 (2008) (for an example of community and cultural norms displacing formal legal expecta-
tions in regards to “heir property” amongst African American communities). 
 130. Winnifred R. Louis & Donald M. Taylor, Rights and Duties as Group Norms: 
Implications of Intergroup Research for the Study of Rights and Responsibilities, in THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES: EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND NORMATIVE 
COMMENTARIES 105, 107 (Norman J. Finkel & Fathali M. Moghaddam eds., 2005).  
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the population systematically mispredicts . . . the content of the law”131 
for reasons that have been attributed to issue of salience,132 rational-
ism (the “need to know”),133 or ignorance.134 
Any gap between perceptions of the rights and responsibilities an 
agreement between parties is presumed to generate, and the rights 
and responsibilities it does generate (or would likely generate were the 
agreement to be analyzed judicially) is exacerbated by the fact that the 
law does not only exist to give effect to private agreements between 
parties, but also to set broader standards of behavior with which  
private agreements should conform. In the context of private legal 
transactions (whether that transaction amounts to an exchange of 
value, the cessation of a legal relationship through divorce, or the  
resolution of a dispute) where the parties have the ability to buy 
knowledge in the form of legal services, it becomes easier to close the 
gap. However, although this positions a party to better evaluate the 
risks and benefits associated with agreeing to be bound by certain 
rights/responsibilities, and to offset or accommodate these realities in 
the bargain, it also increases transaction costs and inversely dimin-
ishes utility. The failure to exhaustively investigate the potential  
implications of a bargain operates to increase transaction risk but  
reduce transaction cost, whilst conversely thoroughness reduces risk 
but increases cost.  
Improvements in the storage and processing capacity of computers 
have enabled the accumulation of vast amounts of data drawn from 
business, social networks, transaction records, and communications. 
This information is valuable insofar as it is capable of being translated 
into strategic insight that informs an assessment of the utility of a 
bargain at an economic rate. Of course, as the scale of data has  
expanded, so has the cost of its review. In the context of private  
ordering this is where AI has principally been used—to improve 
knowledge of transaction risk (including the transaction risk  
associated with pursuing litigation) without increasing transaction 
costs. The application of AI in this context has, as a result, focused  
 
 131. Sean Hannon Williams, Sticky Expectations: Responses to Persistent Over-Optimism 
in Marriage, Employment Contracts, and Credit Card Use, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 733, 734 
(2009). 
 132. See, e.g., LaVell E. Saunders, Collective Ignorance: Public Knowledge of Family Law, 
24 FAMILY COORDINATOR, Jan. 1975, at 69; Jo Casebourne et al., EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS AT 
WORK: A SURVEY OF EMPLOYEES 2005 (Department of Trade and Industry, 2006); Pascoe 
Pleasence & Nigel J. Balmer, Ignorance in Bliss: Modeling Knowledge of Rights in Marriage 
and Cohabitation, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 2, 297 (2012). 
 133. Casebourne, supra note 136, at 19. 
 134. See, e.g., Peter Bowal, A Study Of Lay Knowledge Of Law In Canada, IND. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 121 (1999); PASCOE PLEASENCE & NIGEL J. BALMER, HOW PEOPLE RESOLVE 
‘LEGAL’ PROBLEMS (2014); Catrina Denvir et al., When legal rights are not a reality: do indi-
viduals know their rights and how can we tell?, 35 J. SOC. WELFARE & FAM. L. 139 (2013); 
Pleasence et al., supra note 129, at 837 n.6. 
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less on modeling legal reasoning, and more on gathering inputs that 
might inform the legal (and often the economic) reasoning that takes 
place during bargaining and negotiation—as the use of e-discovery 
tools makes clear. 
In the litigation setting, litigation proceeds only after a detailed  
discovery process has taken place in which relevant material is shared 
between parties.135 This process first involves in-depth document re-
view in which materials are identified as responsive or unresponsive 
to a disclosure request, and materials identified as responsive are  
redacted to uphold legal privilege.136 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the scope 
of potentially relevant documents has only increased as a result of the 
digitization of data, creating an audit trail of correspondence, internet 
search history, phone records, text messages, electronic transfers, file 
downloads, and so forth. The amount of data now subject to disclosure 
vastly increases the time required for manual review and therefore  
the associated transaction costs. So much so that in some instances it 
may be preferable to settle a case rather than assume the costs of  
undertaking disclosure (let alone the cost of other elements of case 
management and representation).137 In an effort to offset these costs, 
AI (largely employing ML techniques, including NLP) has been used 
to develop computer assisted human review (CAHR) and human-aided 
computer review (HACR) techniques.138 This has bred a number of 
commercial e-discovery software packages, examples of which include 
kCura Relativity, Ringtail, Logikcull, and Thomson Reuters eDiscov-
ery Point. 139  The growth in the number of commercial e-discovery  
products made available over the last decade has not been founded  
on advances in AI, but rather on packaging freely available NLP  
code within intuitive interfaces. Hence, although these systems may 
be optimized to perform legal review tasks and reliant on specifically  
 
 
 
 
 
 135. FED. R. CIV. P. 26. 
 136. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
 137. See Ross Chaffin, The Growth of Cost-Shifting in Response to the Rising Cost and 
Importance of Computerized Data in Litigation, 59 OKLA. L. REV. 115 (2006), for a relevant 
example.  
 138. See Christopher Hogan et al., Human-Aided Computer Cognition for E-Discovery, 
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 12TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
AND LAW 194, 194 (2009), for a deciprtion of the distinction between the two. 
 139. See About Us, RELATIVITY, https://www.relativity.com/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/ 
H8Z6-X7AX]; Early Case Assessment, Investigations and Document Review, RINGTAIL, 
https://www.ringtail.com/ringtail-ediscovery-software/early-case-assessment [https://perma. 
cc/AKB5-T3PU]; About Logikcull, LOGIKCULL, https://logikcull.com/company/#about [https:// 
perma.cc/JZB6-SAA6]; eDiscovery Point, THOMSON REUTERS, https://legalsolutions. 
thomsonreuters.com/law-products/solutions/ediscovery-point [https://perma.cc/9BLF-ZJLR]. 
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developed taxonomies and ontologies (though the level of this  
optimization has been subject to debate140), they are not forms of AI 
unique to law. 
Such tools address a particular gap in the market created by the 
redundancy of previous approaches. For example, the increasing scale 
of data has rendered filtering documents by keyword searching (the 
first implementation of document review) insufficient, and modern  
filtering techniques have started to take into account the context of 
words.141 Other implementations (e.g., in the context of email corre-
spondence) have moved to incorporate knowledge about dependencies 
between topics.142 But as is the case with models designed to embody 
legal reasoning processes, with greater model complexity comes  
reduced transparency. This is an issue of no small consequence given 
that discovery is governed by a range of legal obligations and conse-
quences.143 Efforts to discharge those obligations using electronic tools 
require legal approval and this can lag behind development. Predictive 
coding for disclosure (i.e. using ML NLP based techniques to frame a 
disclosure search request, rather than traditional keyword or Boolean 
logic searching) has been available for over two decades.144 Yet in the 
United States, although e-discovery and technology assisted review 
have been permitted by way of the 2015 changes to the Federal Civil 
Procedure Act, and judicially approved in Moore v. Publicis Groupe,145 
challenge is possible in instances where it can be shown that the  
process does not produce reliable and/or proportional results.146  
Similarly, due diligence, contract review, and lease review  
processes have also benefitted from ML implementations. This is  
because in the absence of some form of automation, documents are  
reviewed in a linear, manual fashion, making it difficult to acquire 
 
 140. Eugene Yang et al., Effectiveness Results for Popular e-Discovery Algorithms, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 16TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND 
LAW 261, 261 (2017).  
 141. Phuoc An Vo et al., supra note 110, at 192. 
 142. See Jyothi K. Vinjumur, Evaluating Expertise and Sample Bias Effects for Privilege 
Classification in E-Discovery, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 15TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 
ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 119, 120 (2015). 
 143. See, e.g., West African Gas Pipeline Company Ltd v. Willbros Global Holdings Inc 
[2012] EWHC 396 (TCC), 141 ConLR 151 (England & Wales); Dan H. Willoughby et al., 
Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations: By the Numbers, 60 DUKE L.J. 789, 791 (2010). 
 144. See Michael Aikenhead, Legal Knowledge Based Systems: Some Observations on the 
Future, WEB J. CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES (1995), https://www.bailii.org/uk/other/journals/ 
WebJCLI/1995/issue2/aiken2.html [https://perma.cc/QDM2-H7UV].  
 145. Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182, 183 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2012). 
 146. In England and Wales these methods were not judicially approved as discharging 
the obligation to perform a “reasonable search” under rule 31.7 of Practice Direction 31B on 
the disclosure of electronic documents until the 2016 case of Pyrrho Investments. See Pyrrho 
Investments Ltd v. MWB Property Ltd & Ors, [2016] EWHC 256 (Ch) (England & Wales), 
31B PD (DISCLOSURE OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS). 
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global appreciation of overall risks. However “entity recognition”  
software packages designed to extract key details from a vast range of 
material (structured and unstructured) can vastly accelerate the pro-
cess of document review.147 For example, in the context of a business 
merger requiring the review of vast numbers of mortgage/loan/lease 
agreements for which a purchaser will assume responsibility, the  
extraction of key details (such as value, duration, expiry dates, parties, 
addresses, asset return/yield/encumbrance) enables the quantification 
of risk and an appreciation of the economic and legal liabilities being 
assumed by a purchaser, as well as the potential investment yield. 
These forms of complex analytics bring a range of advantages in  
assessing the risk/benefits of a transaction, including the accuracy of 
asset pricing and the discovery of potential legal problems (e.g., 
through the identification of unusual contract clauses). Whilst these 
implementations have tended to accompany traditional forms of  
bargaining (face to face, verbal, written), there have also been efforts 
to automate elements of the bargaining process, including that of  
offer and acceptance.  
2. Simulating Bargaining 
Attempts to model the way in which bargains are struck in private 
(between individual rather than corporate actors), have drawn on the-
ories from the social, behavioral, and economic sciences. More recently, 
game theory has been used to inform formal and normative models of 
bargaining148 and to augment/underpin the dynamics of hybrid rule-
based/case-based reasoning software created to simulate bargaining  
in family law disputes.149 Though the intent is to simulate “real life” 
bargaining, the extent to which game theory accurately represents 
how bargaining agents operate in the real world and the factors  
that inform their evaluation of the risk/benefit/utility of a bargain,  
remains subject to doubt. Models based on game theory often assume 
that agents are perfectly rational and operate to maximize their  
 
 147. See iManage RAVN, IMANAGE, https://imanage.com/product/ravn/ [https://perma. 
cc/27W2-KBAG]; About Kira Systems, KIRA, https://www.kirasystems.com/about/ [https:// 
perma.cc/SKH5-BJWD]; Homepage, BRAINSPACE, https://www.brainspace.com/ [https:// 
perma.cc/N7LQ-BJV3]; About Drooms, DROOMS, https://drooms.com/en/about [https:// 
perma.cc/HP5H-QW5P]. 
 148. See, e.g., Elisa Burato & Matteo Cristani, Contract Clause Negotiation by Game 
Theory, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 11TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 71 (2007) (discussing the use of game theory to simulate the process 
of contract clause negotiation). 
 149. See, e.g., John Zeleznikow & Emilia Bellucci, Family-Winner: Integrating Game 
Theory and Heuristics to Provide Negotiation Support, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTEENTH 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LEGAL KNOWLEDGE BASED SYSTEMS 21, 22 (2003); Emilia 
Bellucci & John Zeleznikow, Family-Negotiator: An Intelligent Tool for Supporting Legal 
Negotiation in Australian Family Law, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH CONFERENCE OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS 359 (1997). 
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utility in all circumstances, despite research observing that humans 
“often do not actually have the stable utility functions postulated by 
both rational-actor theory and usual versions of bounded-rationality  
theory.”150  
Bargaining is also contingent upon the transmission of beliefs, since 
each agent must believe that a certain decision is capable of benefiting 
them both in order for a bargain to be struck/negotiation to be success-
ful. Belief transmission is not static but dynamic, evolving in light of 
the passing of time, the receipt of new information, the network in 
which exposure to the belief occurs, and the resistance to belief change 
exhibited by an agent when faced with contradictory information. 151 It 
is possible to accommodate some of these dynamic features to, for  
example, incorporate a measure of authority to represent the weighted 
plurality of beliefs in an agent’s local networks as others have done.152 
Yet, the complexity of human decision-making in respect of law,  
bargaining, and other difficult problems may not be capable of expres-
sion via AI. Arguably, the interaction between agent-based models,  
social identity theory, and nudge economics that combine to produce  
a bargain in a given situation are unlikely to accommodate distillation 
into chains of rules (in the case of symbolic approaches) or  
intelligible mappings between inputs and outputs (in the case of  
sub-symbolic/probabilistic methodologies). And, in respect of the latter, 
there are risks associated with bargaining to a “curve.”153  
Certain software such as “Picture it Settled,” which employs nego-
tiation move planning and probabilistic evaluation of case outcome, 
has enjoyed some commercial success.154 Other tools, such as eBay’s 
dispute resolution platform, which uses a rules-based decision tree to 
diagnose problems and propose options for resolution, have come to 
replace human mediated forms of online dispute resolution (ODR).155 
Nevertheless, simulated models of bargaining remain a niche area, 
though one that continues to capture the imagination of a range of 
stakeholders who see it as capable of promoting access to justice and 
accelerating the bargaining and dispute resolution process between 
 
 150. See, e.g., Osoba & Davis, An Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning Perspective 
on Social Simulation: New Data and New Challenges, supra note 121, at 10. 
 151. See id. at 17–18 (showing that if the initial beliefs of all agents are specified and the 
simulation is then executed, the fraction of the agents believing “something” changes over 
time). 
 152. See id. 
 153. See Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 31, at 1339. 
 154. See About, PICTURE IT SETTLED, http://www.pictureitsettled.com/about-2/ [https:// 
perma.cc/QU6J-9APD]. 
 155. Ayelet Sela, Can Computers Be Fair? How Automated and Human-Powered Online 
Dispute Resolution Affect Procedural Justice in Mediation and Arbitration, 33 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISPUT. RESOL. 91, 93 (2018). 
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lay parties.156 Indeed, it remains an active area of research for the likes 
of Facebook,157 notwithstanding the fact that implementing such tools 
in practice relies upon greater structural changes to the legal system.   
In alternative dispute resolution systems the law is framed around 
dispute disposal via settlement,158 necessitating cooperation of both 
parties, awareness of what is a fair outcome, and awareness of the  
consequences attached to non-compliance. 159  In the absence of  
these conditions being met, the “law” that emerges in the process of 
bargaining becomes merely a reflection of the power-relations/equality 
of arms between parties. Systems may incentivize cooperation and/or 
introduce protections to constrain the actions of those who exhibit poor 
bargaining abilities, though not without a loss of autonomy. Even with 
such protections, agreements reached can be reneged upon, with the 
formal legal system offering the only avenue of recourse. And, whilst 
this is not an issue unique to bargaining that occurs online, there is 
reason to believe that technology exacerbates a sense of detachment 
from responsibility,160 perhaps more so where autonomy is viewed as 
being impeded.161  
Although the law has adopted a technological equivalence ap-
proach—a belief that laws and rules should be equivalent in online and 
offline spaces—this does not always correspond with user perceptions. 
The disinhibiting effect of online communication leads to an online/of-
fline cognitive divide in which the consequences of actions in the online 
world are not always seen as translating to the offline world. 162 For 
this reason enforcement remains a key issue in respect to bargaining 
 
 156. Among those interested parties are the Civil Justice Council of England and Wales, 
who have proposed that an online dispute resolution system for low value civil claims incor-
porating an “automated negotiation” process would enable better administration of justice, 
though have remained silent with regards to the more critical details regarding feasibility 
and function. See CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION ADVISORY GROUP, 
ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR LOW VALUE CIVIL CLAIMS 3–5 (2015). 
 157. Mike Lewis et al., Deal or No Deal? Training AI Bots to Negotiate, FACEBOOK 
ENGINEERING (June 14, 2017), https://code.fb.com/ml-applications/deal-or-no-deal-training-
ai-bots-to-negotiate/ [https://perma.cc/V35N-N8CY]; see also Mike Lewis et al., Deal or No 
Deal? End-to-End Learning for Negotiation Dialogues, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2017 
CONFERENCE ON EMPIRICAL METHODS IN NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING 2443 (2017). 
 158. Extrapolating Genn’s argument that in the context of alternative dispute resolu-
tion, the result is access to a “settlement” and not to “justice.” As, “[t]he mediator does not 
make a judgement about the quality of the settlement.” Hazel Genn, What Is Civil Justice 
For? Reform, ADR, and Access to Justice, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 397, 411 (2012). 
 159. See generally id. 
 160. See, e.g., Jonathan A. Obar & Anne Oeldorf-Hirsch, The Biggest Lie on the Internet: 
Ignoring the Privacy Policies and Terms of Service Policies of Social Networking Services, 
INFO., COMM. & SOC’Y 1, 1–11 (2016) (discussing the tendency of social media users to accept 
a platform’s privacy policy “without accessing, viewing, or reading any part of it”). 
 161. Mary L. Cummings, Automation and Accountability in Decision Support System 
Interface Design, 32 J. TECH. STUD. 23, 23 (2006). 
 162. Brian Christopher Jones, The Online/Offline Cognitive Divide: Implications for 
Law, 13 SCRIPTED 83, 87–91 (2016); Obar & Oeldorf-Hirsch, supra note 160, at 15. 
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and failure to accommodate dimensions of enforcement in the online 
space ultimately diminishes the potential contribution automated  
negotiation systems might make to access to justice. The seeming lack 
of consideration as to how enforcement might feature as part of an  
automated AI-enhanced bargaining system is interesting given that 
separately, an entire field of enforcement and compliance software  
has developed as part of the “regtech” (regulatory technology) move-
ment.163  
C.   Public Enforcement & Private Compliance 
Technology has been applied in a number of ways in public enforce-
ment and private compliance to support the coercive function of law. 
Public enforcement refers to the work undertaken by public agencies 
to monitor adherence to rules or access to entitlements. This activity 
is not limited to criminal justice agencies, but also incorporates the 
work of government departments authorized to allocate resources and 
tasked with monitoring this allocation. As with other domains, soft-
ware development in the regulatory field have involved both symbolic 
and non-symbolic approaches to AI, yielding tools to: identify welfare 
fraud,164 determine supplementary benefit entitlement,165 identify tax 
law abuse,166 and address conflict of laws in legislative drafting.167 In 
criminal justice, the U.S. has led the application of statistical tech-
niques to data containing information about reoffending rates and  
socio-demographic characteristics to inform parole decisions,168 with 
other jurisdictions following suit.169 ML has also been used to model 
 
 167. See, e.g., THE REGTECH BOOK: THE FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY HANDBOOK FOR 
INVESTORS, ENTREPRENEURS AND VISIONARIES IN REGULATION (Janos Barberis et al. eds., 
2019). 
 168. Amie Meers et al., Lessons Learnt About Digital Transformation and Public 
Administration: Centrelink’s Online Compliance Intervention, COMMONWEALTH 
OMBUDSMAN, July 2017, at 4; ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW COUNCIL, AUTOMATED ASSISTANCE 
IN ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION MAKING: REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL 15 (2004). 
 165. See T.J.M. Bench-Capon et al., Logic Programming for Large Scale Applications in 
Law: A Formalisation of Supplementary Benefit Legislation, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1ST 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 190, 191–92 (1987) 
(discussions relating to DHSS Demonstrator Project at Imperial University). 
 166. Erik Hemberg et al., Tax Non-Compliance Detection Using Co-Evolution of Tax 
Evasion Risk and Audit Likelihood, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 15TH INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON ARTIFIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & LAW 79, 79 (2015). 
 167. Tingting Li et al., A Model-Based Approach to the Automatic Revision of Secondary 
Legislation, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTEENTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 202, 204 (2013). 
 168. BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION : PROFILING, POLICING, AND 
PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 7–38 (2007).  
 169. For example, England and Wales have recently reported using historical police rec-
ords to inform custody risk decisions. See Chris Baraniuk, Durham Police AI to Help with 
Custody Decisions, BBC NEWS ONLINE (May 10, 2017), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ 
technology-39857645 [https://perma.cc/4DPD-KV2Z]. 
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the “future dangerousness” of parolees and inform sentencing deci-
sions,170 whilst neural networks have been used to extract “entities” 
(“facts”) from police reports to aid in the criminal investigation pro-
cess.171 Further variations in the form of “smart city infrastructure” 
have been designed to: alert enforcement agencies to gunshots fired in 
real time by using ML to analyze acoustic sensor data,172 use AI secu-
rity cameras for the identification of unattended bags in busy areas,173 
and detect crime clusters for the purposes of resource management.174  
In the realm of private enforcement, self-governance—in which  
regulators have taken the veracity of data contained within corporate 
information returns on trust—has become increasingly uncommon  
following the 2008 global financial crisis.175 This has seen regulators 
permit less autonomy and demand more granular information from 
regulated entities.176 These increased regulatory duties have acted as 
a catalyst for the development of AI tools intended to minimize the cost 
of regulatory compliance for certain industries. This is of particular 
relevance in finance, where large exposures, liquidity measures, col-
lateral, capital levels, and stress tests must be reported to regulatory 
agencies, and where discharging obligations in respect of prudential 
regulations, data reporting, execution of trades, money laundering, fi-
nancing of terrorism, due diligence (Know your Customer—KYC), and 
 
 170. See generally RICHARD A. BERK, CRIMINAL JUSTICE FORECASTS OF RISK: A MACHINE 
LEARNING APPROACH (2012). 
 171. See, e.g., Michael Chau et al., Extracting Meaningful Entities from Police Narrative 
Reports, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2002 ANNUAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON DIGITAL 
GOVERNMENT RESEARCH 1 (2002). 
 172. See ShotSpotter Technology, SHOTSPOTTER, http://www.shotspotter.com/technology 
[https://perma.cc/AX2L-WKMA]. 
 173. See, e.g., Intel AI Developer Program: Unattended Baggage Detection Using Deep 
Neural networks in Intel Architecture, INTEL DEVELOPER ZONE (last updated Apr. 16, 2018), 
https://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/unattended-baggage-detection-using-deep-neural-
networks-in-intel-architecture [https://perma.cc/PEN6-ECUW]; Movidius, INTEL MOVIDIUS, 
https://www.movidius.com/ [https://perma.cc/H3JY-BYH3]. 
 174. See Homepage, PREDPOL, http://www.predpol.com/ [https://perma.cc/DVX2-
LH2L]. 
 175. This is illustrated with reference to the Supranational Basel II Capital adequacy 
framework (which specifies the amount of cash reserves that must be retained by a financial 
institution in order to cover market, credit, and operating risks), in respect of which large 
financial institutions were permitted to use their own risk management models in determin-
ing the level of capital to be held. However, this created an incentive to underestimate credit 
risk so as to minimize the size of compulsory ring-fenced capital. See, e.g., Douglas W. Arner 
et al., FinTech, RegTech, and the Reconceptualization of Financial Regulation, 37 NW. J. 
INT’L LAW & BUS. 371, 388 (2017); Harald Benink & George Kaufman, Turmoil Reveals the 
Inadequacy of Basel II, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2008), https://www.ft.com/content/0e8404a2-
e54e-11dc-9334-0000779fd2ac [https://perma.cc/V22D-E8JR]. 
 176. Harriet Agnew, Andy Haldane Seeks Real-Time Global View, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 31, 
2014), https://www.ft.com/content/4a2fbe2e-6053-11e4-88d1-00144feabdc0 [https://perma. 
cc/2ATG-2BSK]. 
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data protection can be onerous.177 AI has also been used to enhance 
business intelligence, with complex models employed to build  
consumer credit risk algorithms that draw on information about  
the debtor, and on the historical transaction (default) patterns of con-
sumers.178 Variations that have made it to the market include tools 
that employ a combination of rule-based, ML, and NLP approaches  
to provide onboarding/customer screening, transaction and trade  
monitoring, alert management and investigation solutions, and regu-
latory update dashboards.179  
Increased regulation and reporting requirements are one way of 
managing risk, though the pressure placed on organizations and insti-
tutions to discharge these responsibilities as efficiently as possible, can 
lead to the principles and values enshrined in other laws being sacri-
ficed in the service of compliance. The use of AI to discharge regulatory 
duties may offer public benefit where the costs of compliance are not 
ultimately passed onto consumers, as may ordinarily be the case. How-
ever, technology in the regulatory space may operate to prioritize risk 
mitigation in favor of other goals and values enshrined by law. For 
example, the use of ML in retail banking to predict the probability of 
a customer defaulting on a loan can have perverse consequences. In a 
regulatory environment that dissuades excessive risk-taking, refusing 
loans and prioritizing assets with a better risk/yield profile may oper-
ate to exclude a wide range of customers who report socio-demographic 
characteristics that have been historically associated with higher rates 
of default.180 
Compliance with regulation, particularly where that compliance  
involves automation, may create perverse incentives to operate in a 
way that brings into play other risks.181 Evidently, this is not a conse-
quence of AI, but may be exacerbated by AI depending on the goals to 
which algorithms are orientated—exemplifying the broader AI Value 
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Alignment discussion. 182  It is not clear how regulatory technology 
might be programed or how it might respond to ethical dilemmas that 
occur in particular business contexts. Choices inevitably have to be 
made but doing so can lead to a form of inequality that is magnified 
and ultimately structurally embedded as a result of its application at 
arm’s length from human decision-makers.183  
This only serves to reinforce the fact that in the enforcement of law, 
as with its interpretation and application, the benefits brought by AI 
are not evenly distributed. AI tools further the interests, agendas, as-
sumptions, and expectations of their creators. Whilst not all interests 
are to be construed cynically, it is nonetheless important to try to make 
sense of the risks posed by various AI systems and approaches; to look 
beyond specific examples so as to consider the framework that emerges 
at the intersection of AI and law and in whose interests it serves.  
D.   Representing Law using AI 
AI systems necessarily impose a particular interpretation of what 
the law is and how its constituent features (interpretation, application, 
and enforcement) should function. As our review of these systems 
makes clear, technical complexity can operate to obscure a clear view 
of the implications associated with implementation. Often these com-
plexities are exacerbated in the market where vendors have a vested 
interest in generating a sense of awe as to the seemingly sentient/ 
superhuman nature of certain products. However, our understanding 
of legal AI can be vastly simplified if instead of focusing on the detailed 
technical intricacies of the technology itself, we focus on the model of 
law that a given AI approach necessarily imposes. If we are cognizant 
of the model of law being imposed, then we are better positioned to 
assess whether that model is appropriate in a given situation.  
As our review of the development of law machines reveals, law has 
been variously represented in AI systems as a product of formalist  
interpretation of source material (rule-based systems), judicial custom 
(case-based reasoning), sociological bias (data-driven systems), norma-
tively framed bargaining outcomes (argumentation systems), linguis-
tic interpretation (NLP systems), and regulatory self-governance (Reg-
Tech). But, although legal AI has done well to represent the various 
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manifestations of law and the theoretical models thought to underpin 
these manifestations, it does less well to integrate these models in a 
way that recognizes their pluralistic interplay. Though not always  
the case,184 each incarnation of legal AI tends to reflect only one inter-
pretation of how we understand “law,” and in doing so implies that it 
is possible for law (as a system) to be represented via a single explan-
atory model that is mutually exclusive from and superior to other  
models of understanding.  
We oppose this view: as a complex system, the crux of “law” lies not 
in one model of interpretation, but in the interaction between all  
of these models of interpretation. Legal systems exist not just to give 
effect to rights and responsibilities, but also to provide an infrastruc-
ture within which those rights and responsibilities can be contested, 
developed, adapted, and evolved to better balance interests, reflect  
social needs, enact justice, and accommodate rule of law constraints. 
As such, it is not possible to account for the many and varied construc-
tions of law using one computational (or for that matter epistemologi-
cal) paradigm. Any application of AI that adopts one computational 
representation of law to the exclusion of all others, must consider  
the impact of doing so. This is well known by many working within  
the field of AI, though it is a point at risk of being overlooked by  
implementing organizations in the public and private sector. The 
model that law takes when enshrined in the infrastructure of technol-
ogy also has certain consequences for the rule of law. These are issues 
we discuss further in Part III. 
III.   THE RULE OF (MACHINE-MADE) LAW 
Efforts to measure the strength of the rule of law in a particular 
jurisdiction have varied in respect to method and focus. In line with 
the United Nation’s approach,185 the Organisation for Economic Coop-
eration and Development’s (OECD) method of evaluation relies on in-
stitutional features that install the conditions necessary for the rule of 
law to flourish.186 Accordingly, objective indicators of progress, such as 
the creation of legal guarantees of due process or a legal framework to 
guarantee impartiality of the judiciary, are favored over evaluation as 
 
 184. See, e.g., Zeleznikow & Stranieri, supra note 12, at 185. 
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to whether adherence to these legal requirements occurs in practice.187 
This top-down institutional focus does not consider what the citizen-
experience of justice might reveal about the state of the rule of law in 
a jurisdiction. Structural reforms intended to enhance the rule of law 
speak to intent but not to operability, which can only be understood in 
the context of the experience of justice.188  
Increasingly, calls have been made to recognize bottom-up indica-
tors that provide qualitative and experiential insight into how the rule 
of law is actualized in practice by those subject to the law.189 For an 
individual, taking formal action to enforce a right is only likely to merit 
the effort if the system within which interpretation and enforcement 
occurs is perceived to be functional, impartial, fair, and accessible. 
These perceptions color informal dispute resolution, which is said to 
occur in the “shadow of the law,” with parties having reference to the 
likely interpretation/sanction imposed by the court.190 By extension,  
issues are resolved not just in the “shadow of the law,” but in the 
“shadow of the rule of law,” with parties considering the functionality, 
impartiality, fairness, and accessibility of institutions trusted to make 
decisions. Formal systems governed by weak legal order have a flow 
on effects reflected in the “private ordering” that occurs in relation to 
informal dispute resolution.191  
For AI, both the top-down (structural/institutional/constitutional/ 
formal) and bottom-up (experiential) dimensions of the rule of law are 
of importance. The potential of AI as a means by which to improve 
justice must be assessed with reference to the institutional and expe-
riential rule of law impact as well as the distribution of this impact. In 
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the section that follows we consider the key rule of law considerations 
that are raised in the application of AI to law. We look specifically at 
the capacity of AI to balance procedural versus substantive justice, and 
to enhance (or undermine) the neutrality, transparency, and accessi-
bility of the legal system, and the autonomy of legal agents.  
A.   Substantive versus Procedural Justice 
A key structural dimension of the rule of the law is the way in which 
legal outcomes balance procedural versus substantive justice. Whilst 
procedural justice is enshrined in the rules that govern how the law is 
made and applied, substantive justice is bound in the consequences 
that derive from this process of “making” or “applying.” These goals 
are diametrically opposed. To permit a higher degree of substantive 
justice is to permit a lower degree of procedural justice.192 Whilst for 
some, (notably Jerome Frank) substantive justice is viewed as taking 
priority such that where justice and the rule of law diverge; “the rule 
of law is pernicious to the extent that it detracts from achieving jus-
tice.”193 For others, such as Robert H. Bork, there is no universal agree-
ment as to what constitutes substantive justice other than by “refer-
ence to some system of moral or ethical values that has no objective or 
intrinsic validity of its own and about which men can and do differ.”194 
On this view, adherence to the procedural constraints of the rule of law 
is the closest to what we might call “objective” justice.195  
If, as has been argued, procedure is more important than outcome, 
then rule-based AI systems offer a means by which to safeguard con-
sistency of legal decision-making and provide a level of certainty in the 
law that does not exist at present. Such systems would operate to em-
phasize the scientific character of the law in which key dimensions of 
the rule of law, namely conformity to reason, uniformity, and certitude 
are prioritized above all else.196 Indeed, there are those who advocate 
rule-based reasoning as a means of enhancing the rule of law, observ-
ing the scientific (formalistic) character of law as the only path  
by which to safeguard full, equal, and exact justice. 197  Rule-based  
judgment systems may have the effect of instigating a shift away  
from what D’Amato describes as living under the rule of persons, as 
opposed to living under the rule of law.198 But in evaluating the merits 
 
 192. See Barnett, supra note 20, at 598–99. 
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 197. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 605 (1908). 
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of this approach, we must consider whether all that is lost when we 
remove the humanness of legal judgment is the institutionalization of 
arbitrariness, discretion, and/or bias.199 
The impact of this loss turns on whether the ends (fair outcomes) 
are seen to occupy a position of greater importance than the means 
(consistent procedure). Although the flexibility that we come to associ-
ate with human judgment generates a degree of uncertainty and  
ambiguity, it may also fulfill a positive function in the application and 
interpretation of law. Firstly, because it enables “just” outcomes to be 
reached, and secondly, because legal evolution relies on this discretion, 
allowing legal interpretation to act in reflection of and reaction to 
broader social change. 200  The architecture of rule-based reasoning  
systems is such that all the information must be contained within the 
system from the start. Such systems cannot respond to the evolution 
of the law without requiring frequent rebuilding, nor would evolution 
of the law be permitted if formal systems were to replace the existing 
legal ecology. There is reason to be cautious of making the law into a 
system of rules in the service of technology,201 such that we might  
concede, as Weizenbaum has done, that although computers can make 
judicial decisions, they ought not be given such tasks.202 Crucially,  
despite their ability to learn, it is not clear that machine-learning tools 
escape these issues of legal stagnancy, and in fact, when developed for 
the purpose of legal decision-making, may only serve to exacerbate 
stagnancy by rendering new outcomes a facsimile of those that have 
gone before. 
B.   Institutionalizing Bias 
As a tool to assist legal decision makers, the predictions derived 
from data-driven systems offer insight into factors that influence an 
outcome. But whilst they may operate as a form of system monitoring, 
capable of flagging up administrative or judicial decisions that suspi-
ciously diverge from previous decisions, they also present a degree of 
risk. Although ML methods are not numerically stagnant, as Bayesian 
approaches enable “rules” (as defined by the numerical relationships 
or weights between inputs and outputs) to update upon receipt of new 
data (in the form of new case decisions 203 ), ML systems can be 
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functionally stagnant, representing a self-fulfilling prophecy of 
sorts.204 Realists argue that legal interpretation is the product of a 
whole range of different factors, only some of which are rooted in  
deductive or analogical reasoning.205 Producing a ML model that de-
termines the outcome of a case by replicating the influence of certain 
factors in existing data acts only to propagate similar such outcomes.206  
In other words, data can encode biases due to the human decisions 
that this data represents, and ML reliant on this data can operate to 
institutionalize this bias.207 Whilst claims of “biased” computer pro-
grams suggest an ethical failure on behalf of designers, such problems 
may more commonly reflect methodological and technical issues with 
data, only some of which might be avoidable. So, whilst ML has the 
potential to eliminate bias from decision-making, allowing for models 
to be tweaked by reducing the effect of certain irrelevant characteris-
tics on an outcome,208 this assumes that the underlying data is not 
compromised (biased) through improper sampling, collection, or 
simply because those using it have failed to appreciate the systemic or 
historic inequalities it reflects.209 
The likelihood of institutionalizing bias within a model bias is not 
so remote. Widely used criminal risk prediction software in the U.S. 
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has already been shown to routinely assign higher levels of risk to the 
assessments of black subjects.210 This is also true in respect of NLP, 
where the gendered nature of language has ramifications for the mod-
els produced from natural language data.211 While the detection and 
removal of bias from text is an active area of research,212 the issue of 
latent bias in NLP is far from solved. Similar such challenges arise in 
the application of AI to the fields of finance and medicine, where there 
is the potential for AI agents to inadvertently discriminate against a 
loan applicant or a medical patient on the basis of age, gender, sexual-
ity, etc.213 Moreover, in crime detection and enforcement, the implica-
tions arising from the imposition of certain technologies may run coun-
ter to the goal the technology is intended to achieve. Predictive policing 
software that identifies crime hot-spots risks reinforcing a vicious  
cycle of increased police presence in neighborhoods already subject to 
over-policing.214 These flaws can be understood if we recognize the 
method being used to develop the software, but they are not neces-
sarily straightforward to pinpoint where the complexity of a model  
hinders its explainability, or the commercial interests of a developer 
inhibits disclosure and restricts transparency.215 
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C.   Transparency 
The transparency of legal decision-making plays a crucial role in 
shaping public perceptions of the fairness of the justice system.  
It speaks to the perceived structural and experiential integrity of  
the legal system and operates as a barometer for the relative strength 
of the rule of law. AI, particularly ML, raises concerns regarding  
the explainability and robustness of the decisions made. Automated  
decision-making systems implemented with the intent of facilitating  
access to justice by enhancing consistency may in practice operate as 
a barrier to the obtainment of fair outcomes. This risk can arise as a 
function of design or of implementation, with the latter risk magnified 
where the process by which automated decisions are reached are  
procedurally and substantively different from those processes adhered 
to by human decision-makers.216 
Thus, there is particular concern associated with applying deep 
learning in certain contexts (including law) where explainability is 
key, as the outcomes produced cannot always be clearly and systemat-
ically interpreted.217 It may be difficult for a clinician to explain to a 
patient why they have been given a prognosis of five years to live ra-
ther than ten as expected, just as it may be difficult for a loan officer 
to justify the denial of a loan to a prospective customer without a sub-
stantive basis for doing so. Similarly, a decision to find a defendant 
guilty, or to sentence someone to more than the average incarceration 
period for a particular crime, needs to be supported with clear reasons. 
The use of such algorithms in a public or private administrative capac-
ity (e.g., to determine access to legal aid, to determine access to the 
entitlements of citizenship, to vet potential employees, or to assess an 
applicant’s credit risk), involves interaction with the law and with 
characteristics protected by law. These are the sorts of protections that 
can be easily (deliberately or inadvertently) subverted by machine  
decision-making, and ascribing responsibility for failure may prove  
difficult.  
There are also constraints imposed as a result of technological  
infrastructures. For example, accuracy in ML is based on the raw 
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prediction performance of an algorithm exposed to “unseen data” (or 
new cases/combinations of facts) as compared to accuracy achieved in 
other similar such studies.218 It is not always possible to achieve 100% 
accuracy, and some level of inaccuracy is always accepted. In instances 
where an algorithm is charged with determining whether a picture is 
of a cat or a dog, the ramifications of an error (at least in the abstract) 
are relatively minor. However, the impact of error is of far greater 
magnitude in regard to legal decision-making, particularly where  
systems fulfill a “gatekeeping” function. Whilst a right to explanation 
exists in the U.S. in relation to credit score,219 it is not clear the extent 
to which the right exists in relation to other forms of administrative 
decision-making.220 Certainly if the court’s decision in State v. Loomis 
is indicative, that right might extend only to ensuring that decision- 
makers (as opposed to subjects) are provided with a written warning 
as to the dangers of reliance on certain algorithmic assessments.221 
These issues force us to consider the level of machine error we are will-
ing to accept given that this machine error compounds any existing 
human error in the labeled data on which an algorithm is trained.  
D.   Access to Justice 
Access to justice is taken to mean access to the institutions of justice, 
such as courts, dispute resolution services, administrative appeal 
mechanisms to legal services, access to knowledge about one’s rights, 
entitlements and obligations, and the ability (personal or structural) 
to exercise those rights and uphold those responsibilities. 222  Open 
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to EU residents by restricting automated decision-making and creating a right to explana-
tion, the range of limitations and exceptions that apply have been roundly critiqued. See 
Goodman & Flaxman, supra note 180, at 55; Maja Brkan, AI-Supported Decision-Making 
under the General Data Protection Regulation, in 617 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 16TH 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 3, 5 (2017). 
 221. 881 N.W.2d 749, 767 (Wis. 2016) (deciding whether failure to reveal the basis of 
proprietary risk assessment software used in sentencing violated the defendant’s due process 
rights).  
 222. Whilst acknowledging that “in practice access to justice defies definition” and is 
“used as a handle to justify all sorts of policies designed to have quite different outcomes,” 
Hazel Genn provides the following definition:  
At its most basic it is about access to procedures for making rights effective 
through state-sponsored public and fair dispute resolution processes. It implies 
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access to the courts is of critical importance—courts operate to uphold 
standards of behavior, which in turn frame the informal application, 
interpretation, and enforcement of law.223 Courts are the only means 
by which to legitimize the threat of enforcement and the view that real 
or perceived consequences may actually arise.224 Yet, whilst access to 
(formal and informal) adjudication systems are important, mere access 
is not sufficient if would-be users lack the knowledge and capacity to 
make use of this access.225 In practice, access requires that the public 
have the requisite knowledge, understanding, confidence, and capabil-
ity to pursue or defend a legal claim—with or without professional  
assistance.  
To date, much has been said about the capacity for AI tools to aid 
in facilitating access to justice; either through increasing public 
knowledge of the law, democratizing access to the legal services  
market by reducing costs, and/or increasing the capacity of adjudica-
tive institutions to handle claims by making processes more effi-
cient.226 Indeed, a number of examples previously provided suggest 
progress in these areas. Further, as-yet unrealized ambitions to use 
NLP techniques to translate (user) natural language to the legalese 
required in a “particulars of claim” statement, to fill out a court  
document, or to automate points of contest in a negotiation, represent 
a natural evolution of much of the AI and law work already done. Yet, 
despite much talk about the potential utility of AI systems in providing 
 
equal access to authoritative enforceable rulings and outcomes that reflect the 
merits of the case in light of relevant legal principles. It does not imply that laws 
are necessarily just, but that individuals have a fair opportunity for their rights 
to be determined according to the prevailing promulgated rules. 
HAZEL GENN, JUDGING CIVIL JUSTICE 115 (2010) [hereinafter GENN, JUDGING CIVIL JUSTICE]. 
See also Rebecca L. Sandefur, Access to What?, 148 DAEDALUS 49, 50 (2019) (More recently, 
Sandefur has proposed “[t]here is access when disputes and problems governed by civil law . . . 
resolve with results that satisfy legal norms.”); DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
(2004). 
 223. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 190, at 990–92.  
 224. As Genn explains,  
Authoritative judicial determination has a critical public function in common-
law systems, creating the framework or the “shadow” in which the settlement of 
disputes can be achieved. That it is underpinned by the coercive power of the 
state provides the background threat that brings unwilling litigants to the nego-
tiating table and makes it possible for weaker parties to enforce their rights and 
to expose wrongdoing. 
Genn, What is Civil Justice For?, supra note 158, at 398. Genn further explains, “While the 
reality is that most cases settle, a flow of adjudicated cases is necessary to provide guidance 
on the law and, most importantly, to create the credible threat of litigation if settlement is 
not achieved.” GENN, JUDGING CIVIL JUSTICE, supra note 222, at 21. 
 225. Rt. Hon Lord Bingham of Cornhill, supra note 20, at 6. 
 226. See, e.g., ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION ADVISORY GROUP, supra note 127, at 3; 
RICHARD SUSSKIND & DANIEL SUSSKIND, THE FUTURE OF THE PROFESSIONS: HOW 
TECHNOLOGY WILL TRANSFORM THE WORK OF HUMAN EXPERTS (2015). 
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advice and support in the civil justice resolution process, there are  
no obvious examples where these ambitions have been realized.227  
The “trickle down” benefits of AI in democratizing access to legal 
services for individual consumers of modest means, has been minimal 
at best. Indeed, in some cases AI may actively (though not always ob-
viously) undermine efforts to widen access to justice. Tools that predict 
the likely success of the case may diminish a lawyer’s willingness to 
represent a client in court, no matter how important the cause. Such 
information may also influence the likelihood of a plaintiff’s ability to 
secure third party financing—a phenomenon that has emerged over 
the last decade and is particularly prominent in class action and tort 
cases.228 Rule-based or data-driven systems implemented as a gateway 
to accessing a court (with or without representation) also generate  
further cause for concern. These technologies represent efficiency 
gains for certain actors (usually law firms or government agencies)  
rather than mechanisms by which justice may be made more accessi-
ble to the public.229 As a result, they call into question the effect AI may 
have in distorting equality of arms.  
The use of AI in law also raises a series of existential questions  
regarding the purpose of law. If AI affects a shift in the locus of legal 
decision-making from humans to technology, what role is there for law 
to remain the “primary instrument to guide and sustain legitimate  
expectations between those who share jurisdiction”?230 Where AI is 
charged with moderating interactions between actors (customers,  
clients, citizens) and agents (businesses, government, organizations), 
technology may displace the function of the law in setting legitimate 
expectations to guide shadow bargaining. In such instances, bargain-
ing no longer takes place in the shadow of the law but in the shadow 
of automated decision-making infrastructures. By extension, success 
may have less to do with legal merit and more to do with the likelihood 
 
 227. For example, in Sandefur’s review of 322 access to justice technologies intended for 
non-lawyers, only two purported to use AI technology, with a further one indicating an in-
tention to draw on AI in the development of the software. REBECCA L. SANDEFUR, LEGAL 
TECH FOR NON-LAWYERS: REPORT OF THE SURVEY OF US TECHNOLOGIES 31, 53, 57 (2019). 
 228. Jason Krause, Third-party financing is growing, and lawyers are big players, ABA 
J. (July 1, 2016), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/%0Barticle/third_party_financing_ 
is_growing_and_lawyers_are_big_players [https://perma.cc/EWP9-CKEQ]. 
 229. For example, the related example produced by the UK government’s introduction of 
a telephone gateway for access to legal aid in 2012. Although not AI enhanced, the gateway 
was variously accused of creating a hurdle to access to justice. Ben Hickman & David Old-
field, Keys to the Gateway: An Independent Review of the Mandatory Civil Legal Advice  
Gateway, PUB. L. PROJECT (2015), https://publiclawproject.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/ 
data/resources/199/Keys-to-the-Gateway-An-Independent-Review-of-the-Mandatory-CLA-
Gateway.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JXS-VWXY]. 
 230. Mireille Hildebrandt, Law as Information in the Era of Data-Driven Agency, 79 
MOD. L. REV. 1, 8 (2016).   
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of overturning an automated decision-making process.231 Such issues, 
particularly where they involve inequality of arms between parties 
and where they relate to “settlement” transactions contingent on an 
evaluation of utility and risk/benefit, are likely to undermine bargain-
ing power. This has the effect of displacing the procedural function of 
the rule of law that exists to enable people to stand up for their rights232 
and the due process protections enshrined in the U.S. Constitution. 
More perverse are applications where Big Data is used to gain  
advantage by exploiting weaknesses in the prevailing legal order. For 
example, in Article 33 of the Justice Reform Act France recently 
banned using Big Data about judges to exploit systemic bias and gain 
an advantage over adversaries.233  
Where AI systems extend to bargaining processes, bargaining  
becomes oriented around arriving at an outcome rather than a just 
outcome234 and further, runs the risk of equating the value of bargain-
ing/negotiation with the value of the agreement reached. Such tools 
might increase the likelihood of parties reaching an agreement by  
ensuring a solution in all instances in which parties exhibit overlap-
ping bargaining ranges, but at what cost for procedural justice  
or perceptions of fairness? Individuals are said to care deeply about 
the process by which an outcome is reached, 235  and automated  
systems are likely to not only render these processes opaque, but to 
subsequently diminish belief in the fairness of the steps by which a 
decision has been made. Such tools, whether deployed in or outside of 
 
 231. See Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Enslaving the Algorithm: From a “Right to an 
Explanation” to a “Right to Better Decisions”?, 16 IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 46, 51–52 (2018) 
(discussing the “right to an explanation” in the context of data protection and subject access 
requests).  
 232. Id. at 2.  
 233. Loi 2019–222 du 23 mars 2019 de programmation 2018–2022 et de réforme pour la 
justice [Law 2019-222 of Mar. 23, 2019 on the Reform of Justice], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA 
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Mar. 21, 2019, Article 33 
(stating that “[t]he identity data of magistrates and members of the Registry cannot be re-
used with the purpose or effect of evaluating, analyzing, comparing or predicting their actual 
or alleged professional practices.”). 
 234. This parallels the “anti-adjudication and anti-law discourse” implicit in policy re-
forms occurring in the UK from the 1980s onwards, which has seen access to justice reframed 
as access to an outcome and which has instigated a shift away from access to formal legal 
structures towards mediation and alternative dispute resolution. Genn, What is Civil Justice 
For?, supra note 191, at 409. As a result, Genn argues that access to justice has been re-
defined not as access to the courts or to a “just settlement” but as access to a “settlement”—
as demonstrated by the fact that mediators do not make a judgment about the quality of the 
settlement. Id. at 411. The same is true of bargaining systems, which are not focused on 
matters of fairness, but rather on expedience of settlement. See, e.g., Julia Hörnle, Encour-
aging Online Dispute Resolution in the EU and Beyond, 38 EUR. L. REV 187, 208 (2013) (tak-
ing issue with systems which prioritize efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and automation at the 
expense of due process). 
 239. Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice in Negotiation: 
Procedural Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, 33 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 
473, 477 (2008). 
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the negotiation context, might also be seen to encroach on legal agency 
given that the exercise of justice and access to it becomes bound by the 
parameters set by technology designers and/or the limits of a given 
technology. As Pound has noted, “The effect of all system is apt to be 
petrifaction of the subject systematized.”236  
E.   Legal Agency and the Distribution of Benefits 
Legal agents have been described as “participant in a distinctly  
constituted social condition” within which they are constituted as  
“responsible persons” capable of engaging in “purposive action . . .  un-
derstand[ing] and follow[ing] practical standards,” and “accountable 
for the decisions they make with respect to what the law requires of 
them.”237 Those who design and implement legal AI systems do so in 
order to further a particular agenda, undermining the aspiration that 
the law might exist as a neutral mechanism balancing competing  
interests in society. AI systems have the potential to diminish agency 
by requiring that bargaining/application/adjudication occurs in con-
formance with the constraints of a particular system or process. When 
the choice to make a decision is removed or when decisions amount  
to nothing more than a fait accompli, in which no space is given to 
revision, reflection, or debate, then personal agency is necessarily  
constrained. Behavior mediated via data-driven systems with their 
own form of agency is not independently exercised.238  
Law is not merely information about the legal effect of one’s  
behaviors, but an agent that gives substance to that effect. The idea of 
prospectivity as a fundamental feature of the rule of law implies that 
those subject to the law should be capable of anticipating the legal  
effect of their actions. Yet as Hildebrand observes, data-driven tech-
niques are used more often to anticipate and pre-empt the behavior of 
legal subjects and as such these tools inform the likelihood of taking 
an action and not the implications of doing so.239 That AI tools may 
operate to constrain autonomy and limit agency is of fundamental  
concern given that the creation, interpretation, application, and  
enforcement of law draws legitimacy from the presumed autonomy of 
the actors involved. In a rule of law context, these issues speak to  
 
 
 
 
 
 236. Pound, supra note 197, at 608. 
 237. Stefano Bertea, Legal Form and Agency: Variations on Two Central Themes in 
Fuller’s Legal Theory, 5 JURIS. 96, 98 (2014). 
 238. MIREILLE HILDEBRANDT, SMART TECHNOLOGIES AND THE END(S) OF LAW: NOVEL 
ENTANGLEMENTS OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 8–9 (2015). 
 239. Id.; Hildebrandt, supra note 230, at 10. 
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where accountability might vest for mistakes or poor judgment, as  
well as highlighting those for whom the rewards of AI are likely to 
accumulate.240  
Asking who is likely to benefit from the implementation of AI in 
different settings and what this benefit entails, is key to understand-
ing the potential implications of that implementation on legal agency 
and outcome. In medicine, the lines appear more clear-cut. Benefit is 
defined as that which prolongs life and minimizes suffering. To this 
end, AI has been used to model the underlying causes of diseases,241 
churn through biomedical research papers and flag compounds which 
may be cures to a given disease,242 classify specific genes according  
to their role in disease development, 243  and analyze biomolecular  
structure.244 It has also been used in diagnostic settings in conjunction 
with radiology and ultrasound,245 to detect brain tumors,246 quantify 
risk of Alzheimer’s,247 diagnose liver diseases,248 recognize malignant 
prostate tissue,249  analyze retinal scans,250  and construct models of  
the heart to predict survival chances for patients with pulmonary 
 
 240. Extending legal personhood to AI has heralded calls for further exploration of the 
legal status of autonomous agents and clarification regarding the status, rights, and obliga-
tions of “electronic personalities.” See, e.g., Argyro Karanasiou & Dimitris Pinotsis, Towards 
a Legal Definition of Machine Intelligence: The Argument for Artificial Personhood in the Age 
of Deep Learning, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 16TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 119 (2017). 
 241. See, e.g., Publications, BERG, https://berghealth.com/publications/ [https://perma. 
cc/S73Q-XNRM]. 
 242. See Ken Mulvany, Developing Pharmaceuticals Efficiently with Artificial 
Intelligence, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/developing-
pharmaceuticals-efficiently-artificial-intelligence-1664431 [https://perma.cc/6N3Y-8575]. 
 243. See WuXi NextCODE, Artificial Intelligence Used to Advance Precision Therapy  
for Rare Genetic Disorders of Obesity, PR NEWSWIRE (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www. 
prnewswire.com/news-releases/wuxi-nextcode-artificial-intelligence-used-to-advance-
precision-therapy-for-rare-genetic-disorders-of-obesity-300579919.html [https://perma.cc/ 
RB44-SXK2]. 
 244. See Nic Fleming, Computer-Calculated Compounds, 557 NATURE 55, 57 (2018). 
 245. See SANKETH VEDULA ET AL., TOWARDS CT-QUALITY ULTRASOUND IMAGING USING 
DEEP LEARNING (2017). 
 250. See Guotai Wang et al., Automatic Brain Tumor Segmentation using Cascaded 
Anisotropic Convolutional Neural Networks, in MICCAI BRAINLESION WORKSHOP 178 
(2017). 
 247. Ammarah Farooq et al., A Deep CNN Based Multi-Class Classification of 
Alzheimer’s Disease Using MRI, in 2017 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON IMAGING 
SYSTEMS AND TECHNIQUES 1, 2 (2017). 
 248. See Koichi Ogawa et al., Computer-Aided Diagnostic System for Diffuse Liver 
Diseases with Ultrasonography by Neural Networks, 45 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON NUCLEAR 
SCI. 3069, 3069 (1998). 
 249. See Tillman Loch et al., Artificial Neural Network Analysis (ANNA) of Prostatic 
Transrectal Ultrasound, 39 PROSTATE 198, 200 (1999). 
 250. See Jeffrey De Fauw et al., Automated Analysis of Retinal Imaging Using Machine 
Learning Techniques for Computer Vision, 5 F1000RESEARCH 1573 (2016). 
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hypertension.251 On the face of it, these implementations appear to 
serve the interests of the public, but a closer assessment might call 
into question the disruptive effect of these tools on existing ecologies. 
In medicine as in law, the advice giving/treatment process relies upon 
a functioning lawyer-client/doctor-patient relationship. A third-party 
actor in the form of an ML model may complicate this interpersonal 
connection and weaken the strength of communication. As with most 
technological innovation, some stakeholders are likely to benefit from 
the implementation of AI in certain contexts more than others.252  
AI in law has been driven by those with the most to gain from its 
introduction. This has implicated corporate law firms who have mobi-
lized AI tools to increase efficiency, protect profit margins, and  
increase the ratio of support staff, relative to qualified legal staff.  
This concentration of activity by corporate stakeholders reflects stark 
investment realities as to who has the capital and incentive to invest. 
These pragmatic constraints only serve to reinforce how the benefits 
of AI may be unequally distributed.253 In the public sector, this imbal-
ance may see enhanced efficiency at the cost of diminished fairness, 
with the interests of government (spend reduction) prioritized over the 
interests of justice.254 Elsewhere, the imbalance may enable a third 
 
 255. See Timothy J.W. Dawes et al., Machine Learning of Three-dimensional Right 
Ventricular Motion Enables Outcome Prediction in Pulmonary Hypertension: A Cardiac MR 
Imaging Study, 283 RADIOLOGY 381, 382 (2017). 
 252. In respect of medicine the response of the Royal College of General Practitioners to 
Babylon Health’s publication is informative. See Royal College of General Practitioners, 
Apps and Algorithms May “Support but will Never Replace” GPs, Says RCGP, RCGP  
NEWS (June 27, 2018), https://www.rcgp.org.uk/about-us/news/2018/june/apps-and-
algorithms-may-support-but-will-never-replace-gps-says-rcgp.aspx [https://perma.cc/7VVV-
52JV] (suggesting that Babylon’s service “cherry-picks” more straightforward patients, due 
to the bias in those who can access the app).  
 253. In some cases, the “access to justice” angle appears to be a detour on the road to 
commercialisation. In 2016 software start-up LawGeex invited the public to upload their 
employment contracts so that software could scan the contracts so as to identify unusual 
contract terms or conditions, in what was framed as an access to justice offer. See LawGeex 
Now Reviews Employment Contracts Free, LawGeex (Apr. 19, 2016), https://web.archive.org/ 
web/20160807140250/http://blog.lawgeex.com:80/lawgeex-now-reviews-employment-
contracts-free/ [https://perma.cc/6FCM-KJL8] (‘The more contracts that we review, the bet-
ter our machine learning algorithms get, and the more people we can help.”). The offer was 
short-lived, as their website now returns a 409 error and with no evidence that this personal 
option is still available. See Not Found, Error 404, LAWGEEX, http://blog.lawgeex.com/law-
geex-now-reviews-employment-contracts-free/ [https://perma.cc/75WZ-DHA7]. 
 254. As demonstrated by the Australian Department of Human Services (DHS) “Online 
Compliance Intervention” (OCI) system launched in July 2016. MEERS ET AL., supra note 
183, at 1. The system was designed to automate the investigation and debt raising process 
where DHS detected a discrepancy between the amount of Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) income 
reported to DHS (in respect of welfare benefit receipt) and the amount of PAYG income re-
ported to the Australian Tax Office (ATO). Id. Intended to increase the capacity for discrep-
ancy identification and investigation beyond the level achievable via human oversight, the 
system generated an exponential increase in the number of discrepancies identified. Id. Sus-
tained public criticism emerged as to the transparency, fairness, and usability of the system 
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party to benefit at the expense of others. Whilst the AI enhanced-eBay 
dispute resolution system is routinely lauded, it is worth noting that 
most disputes end in negative feedback being left, followed by termi-
nation of the bargain.255 This negates most of the economic benefits of 
the transaction whilst increasing the cost of bargaining by way of  
inconvenience/postage costs/transaction fees incurred.  
Although AI and the increased automation it facilitates may reduce 
bias, corruption, inefficiency, inconsistency, and inaccessibility, the  
efficacy of a particular technology remains contingent on the broader 
eco-system within which it is deployed and to whom it is made acces-
sible. As Hildebrand proposes “algorithms to delve and further develop 
legal knowledge should primarily serve those subject to the law, not 
first and foremost those administering the law” 256  and should be  
available to all, rather than “restricted to those willing and able to pay 
the fees of the corporate law firms that have the capital to invest.”257  
F.   Assessing Risk versus Benefit 
For those who perceive the law as a reflection of the personal views 
of those people in charge of enacting, applying, and enforcing it, legal 
rules are “objects of discourse, not objects with a concrete nature.”258 
In this context, formalizing the law in a rule-based system, classifying 
future cases with reference to historic cases, linguistic corpora, or psy-
chometric data, silences this discourse by removing the space required 
for it to thrive. In a constitutional democracy, law sustains the balance 
of power between citizens, businesses, and the state, providing a  
 
and the vulnerable user-group subject to OCI debt notifications. Id. at 2. The resulting Sen-
ate inquiry revealed that whilst the algorithmic calculation employed to identify inconsist-
encies replicated that of human decision makers, the information that informed a calculation 
was qualitatively different. Id. Human investigators were required to attempt “every possi-
ble means of obtaining the actual income information.” Id. at 3. Under OCI the onus for 
providing information rested on the claimant, and where that onus was not discharged 
within a specified timeframe, averaged ATO income was used to calculate debt owing. Id. 
This averaging was necessary in order to achieve the underlying efficiency objective the tool 
was intended to introduce. Id. at 4.  
To enable it to automate debt raising in situations where earnings information was 
not forthcoming from the customer, DHS decided to accept the best already available 
evidence to calculate an approximate debt figure by averaging ATO data, rather than 
using its information gathering powers to obtain verified fortnightly data to calculate 
an exact debt figure. This decision was fundamental to the efficiency and scale of the 
system, because it meant that compliance officers did not have to manually intervene 
to obtain fortnightly payroll data.  
Id. at 4. 
 255. Lilian Edwards & Ashley Theunissen, Creating Trust and Satisfaction Online: How 
Important is ADR? The UK eBay Experience, in 21ST BILETA CONFERENCE: GLOBALISATION 
AND HARMONISATION IN TECHNOLOGY LAW 1, 16 (2006). 
 256. Hildebrandt, supra note 230, at 10. 
 257. Id. at 11.  
 258. Leith, Fundamental Errors in Legal Logic Programming, supra note 45, at 548. 
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structure within which agents in society can interact. The fact that 
technology also has the power to regulate these interactions implies 
that “legal and technological instruments are not exchangeable tools 
to achieve specific policy objectives, depending on which tool is more 
efficient or effective.”259 Adopting such an attitude puts us at risk of a 
system in which technology displaces the regulatory power of the 
law—governing the law itself, rather than being governed by it.260  
This necessarily implies a conservative approach to using AI tech-
nologies as an instrument by which to safeguard fundamental princi-
ples of the rule of law. It also urges caution in assuming that such 
technologies can improve the institutional and structural integrity  
of legal systems, without the need for further (human) checks and  
balances. This is particularly relevant given that AI models of law are 
necessarily constrained by the limits of what is technologically possi-
ble at the point of development. Whilst ordinarily the law operates to 
constrain technology, any effort to enshrine the “law” in an AI system 
necessarily allows this technology to constrain the interpretation,  
application, and enforcement of the law. The law cannot be seen to 
exist as separate from the apparatus that gives it effect. Where that 
apparatus is technology, the subject of embodiment (“the law”)  
becomes defined by reference to what the object of embodiment (the 
technological architecture) makes possible.  
Recognizing this, and the model of law imposed by a particular AI 
system, is of value in determining the impact that might result from 
implementation. However, introspection tends to follow rather than 
precede implementation past the point at which the influence of that 
technology has already taken hold. Who has not questioned the valid-
ity of a colored squiggly line appearing under a sentence in MS Word, 
yet deferred to the system in preference to continuing to work under 
an accusation of grammatical ineptitude? This pervasive influence 
leads McGee and Eriksson to refer to MS Word as “the invisible  
grammarian”261 and reinforces the prescience of Weiser’s 1991 claim 
that “The most profound technologies are those that disappear. They 
weave themselves into the fabric of everyday life until they are indis-
tinguishable from it.”262 It is only upon reflection we can start to see 
what might have been possible were we more alive to developments as 
they occurred.  
 
 259. Mireille Hildebrandt, A Vision of Ambient Law, in REGULATING TECHNOLOGIES: 
LEGAL FUTURES, REGULATORY FRAMES AND TECHNOLOGICAL FIXES 175, 178 (Roger 
Brownsword & Karen Yeung eds., 2008). 
 260. Id. at 178–80. 
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Our analysis of the rule of law impact of AI has necessarily adopted 
a critical tone, looking more forcefully at the potential negative rather 
than positive effects. That is not to say that AI cannot make a positive 
contribution to the functioning of the legal system. Human decision 
makers are not infallible, and there are instances where AI can  
be used to bolster, rather than undermine, the integrity and operation 
of the rule of law. It is certainly feasible that AI could play a role  
in remedying defects in the rule of law—democratizing access to 
knowledge about rights and the mechanisms by which to enforce these 
rights. Tools employed in the public sector may play a role in making 
the process of justice more efficient, and in levelling the playing field 
rather than distorting it. Certainly, is it not impossible to think the 
vast amounts of investment capital flowing into legal technology might 
yield dividends for all of society? Nevertheless, we must consider the 
underlying objectives to which such tools are directed and the implica-
tions attached to the representation of law being adopted in any given 
instance. There are a number of pragmatic obstacles that may dictate 
an agenda of AI development that serves private interests over and 
above public interests. These obstacles, discussed further in Part IV, 
provide some insight into the developments we might expect to see  
in the coming years, and who is likely to be setting the agenda for  
progress. 
IV.   AGENDAS & OBSTACLES 
Discussions as to the role of AI in law tend to occupy two different 
ends of the spectrum. Optimists lean towards controversial assertions 
that technology will displace lawyers and legal expertise because it is 
becoming more advanced year-on-year.263 Whilst the skeptics advance 
the view that technology will never be able to undertake the work of a 
lawyer because a lawyer’s work involves a complex interplay of differ-
ent skills.264 Those who argue for the former generally overestimate 
the speed of progress and underestimate the challenges. Those who 
argue for the latter tend to presume that the job of the lawyer remains 
stagnant, or alternatively, perceive incremental change as stag-
nancy.265 At least for the next decade, if not for the foreseeable future, 
pragmatic constraints related to: (A) the commercial incentives, (B)  
access to data, and (C) the skills gap, will see the reality of legal 
 
 263. See, e.g., RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE FUTURE OF LAW: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (2d ed. 1998); RICHARD SUSSKIND & DANIEL SUSSKIND, THE 
FUTURE OF THE PROFESSIONS, supra note 188, at 68–69. 
 264. See, e.g., Dana Remus & Frank Levy, Can Robots Be Lawyers? Computers, 
Lawyers, and the Practice of Law (Nov. 27, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2701092 [https://perma.cc/FWD3-2QJG].   
 265. Change blindness explains this tendency to overlook changes that would normally 
be easily observed. Daniel J. Simons & Ronald A. Rensink, Change Blindness: Past, Present, 
and Future, 9 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 16, 19 (2005). 
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technology development fall between these two extremes. In the fol-
lowing section we consider each of these pragmatic constraints in turn. 
A.   Commercial Incentives 
As earlier discussions have revealed, the finance and banking  
industry has been seen as an early adopter of AI, particularly when 
compared to legal services. This is perhaps not so surprising when we 
consider the numerical nature of most of the data involved in finance, 
the financial resources available when computing power remained an 
expensive commodity, the industry’s access to highly specialized skill 
sets (and the ability to pay high salaries to attract talent), and the 
strong financial incentives that exist to price assets properly (for  
example, options and other derivatives) and predict them into the  
future. Early adoption in finance is even less surprising given that  
ML represents a natural extension of many of the common technical 
analyses conducted by systematic traders in investment banks and 
hedge funds.266  
By contrast, the technology procurement decisions of law firms 
have typically been driven by a desire to avoid the loss of clients or 
limit exposure to liability.267 Law is a knowledge-based occupation and 
there has been resistance to the idea that this knowledge can or should 
be commoditized through the use of technology.268 Moreover, hourly-
billing models, only recently eroded by changes to the market, have 
arguably disincentivized the pursuit of process efficiencies.269 Yet, in 
line with the trends exhibited by their clients, there is growing  
expectation that law firms (particularly those in the service of large 
financial institutions) will utilize technology. As such, for most organ-
izations who shop around for legal services on the basis of price, the 
competitiveness of a quote for legal services will be strongly linked to 
the number of man hours versus computer hours required.  
In spite of claims of slow uptake, the way in which technology has 
been adopted by law firms does not demarcate the legal industry as 
uniquely antediluvian. Adoption or pursuit of new technological  
advancements across the legal industry have not been homogenous. 
Legal service providers have exhibited evidence of engagement at  
 
 266. For example, Chen and Lian’s Protrader expert system was able to predict the 87 
point drop in Dow Jones Industrial Average in 1986. K.C. Chen & Ting-peng Liang, 
PROTRADER: An Expert System for Program Trading, 15 MANAGERIAL FIN. 1, 1 (1989). 
 267. Legal Technology Insider, No IT Please, We’re Making Enough Money Already!, 
LEGAL TECH. INSIDER (Apr. 1, 2004), https://www.legaltechnology.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
2012/01/lti160.pdf [https://perma.cc/LMJ3-K5U6]. 
 268. Maurits Barendrecht, Legal Aid, Accessible Courts or Legal Information? Three 
Access to Justice Strategies Compared, 2011 GLOBAL JURIST Issue 1, Art. 6, at 12; RICHARD 
SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL SERVICES 3 (2008). 
 269. Oskamp & Lauritsen, supra note 2, at 232. 
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both the incubation and deployment stages, and the timing and extent 
of engagement may have less to do with protectionism than is often 
suggested. 270  Dickerson, for example, has advanced the view that 
larger firms (more than a dozen lawyers) tend to disproportionately 
reap the benefits of technology adoption, and this might help explain 
why these entities appear to be leading the charge in respect of  
technology research and development.271 The adoption or development 
of new tools also requires heavy internal investment and an appetite 
for risk. These requirements do not necessarily reflect the organiza-
tional reality of law and the demand for consensus that the partner-
ship model begets. So, whilst some legal service providers have  
invested in software spinouts, this is a strategy that represents a clear 
departure from the core business of legal service delivery.272  
Doing so also introduces additional risk, since the benefits of  
technology adoption are not always clear from the outset. Technology 
adoption requires the support of (public, private, and corporate) clients, 
and ML can raise particular challenges in implementation. Data  
protection requirements and the sensitivities of corporate clients,  
particularly financial institutions, means that cloud storage of client 
data is often prohibited.273 ML technologies must be hosted on-site, a 
solution that vendors (particularly small start-ups) cannot always  
offer. Data stored by firms in externally hosted clouds remove a level 
of control, and whilst encryption technologies minimize third party 
threats, data remains accessible to a cloud host.  
Where data does reside in the cloud, there is a further concern re-
garding intellectual property. ML systems learn from an individual’s 
interaction with the system and where a cloud-based solution is used, 
an individual is interacting with the software provider’s systems and 
servers.274 Not all welcome the fact that software developers benefit 
from the expertise of professional users. These intellectual property 
considerations also constrain the practicality of joint ventures. Where 
cooperation occurs, it does so more often in respect of products that are 
 
 270. SUSSKIND & SUSSKIND, THE FUTURE OF THE PROFESSIONS, supra note 188, at 67–
68.  
 271. F. Reed Dickerson, Electronic Computers and the Practical Lawyer, 14 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 485, 487 (1961). 
 272. See, e.g., Bruce S. Tether, Who Co-Operates for Innovation, and Why? An Empirical 
Analysis, 31 RES. POL’Y 947 (2000) (discussing the incentives and disincentives associated 
with technology, partnerships, and innovation). 
 273. See, e.g., Neil Hodge & Ravi Meah, Don’t Sleepwalk into the Cloud – The Challenges 
for Law Firms and their Clients, LEGAL WEEK (June 25, 2015), https://www.law.com/legal-
week/2015/06/25/dont-sleepwalk-into-the-cloud-the-challenges-for-law-firms-and-their-
clients-2/ [https://perma.cc/8AYZ-6UQU]. Although, there appears to be an emerging uptake 
of cloud technologies within the profession. See, e.g., ILTA & INSIDELEGAL, 2016 
ILTA/INSIDELEGAL TECHNOLOGY PURCHASING SURVEY (2016). Notably, cloud technologies 
bring data protection and ethics obligations.  
 274. For a broad discussion of this IP issue, see Ermert, supra note 209.  
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new to the market, rather than new to a firm, with firms tending to 
collaborate with non-competitors to develop products with mass mar-
ket, rather than firm level appeal.275 This removes what might other-
wise be seen as an incompatible tension between a firm’s interest in 
safeguarding a tool where it bestows a competitive advantage, and a 
developer’s interest in selling this tool to a firm’s competitors.  
A focus on mass-market products resolves the intellectual property 
and competition challenge, yet simultaneously constrains the eco-sys-
tem for innovation. It suggests an agenda of future development led by 
large law firms in the service of large clients and growth of AI in Reg-
Tech and corporate law fields rather than access to justice. The latter 
being a field where the enthusiasm around AI-based technologies wax 
and wane over shorter timescales than longer-term public sector deci-
sion-making can accommodate and where data is not always available 
in the form (or at the scale) required.  
B.   Access to Data 
The predictive ability of an ML system remains substantially more 
dependent on the features selected and data quality/quantity used, 
than the algorithm (or statistical model) employed. In certain circum-
stances, data will be readily available and provided in a format that 
lends itself to analysis. Large-scale datasets of U.S. Supreme Court 
cases yield a rich source of information prime for analysis and for the 
development of related analytical tools. Other publicly available large-
scale data sets (for example, Enron discovery documents) provide 
source material by which to develop and refine new legal software tools, 
whilst privately held datasets give rise to collaborations between start-
up developers and law firms.276 Yet whilst digitization has made cer-
tain forms of data abundant, it is not always the sort of data that is 
required for the analysis of law.  
In contrast to the U.S., which provides Public Access to Court  
Electronic Records (PACER) for the network of federal courts, open 
publishing requirements are often patchy in other jurisdictions. So, 
although the U.S. PACER system has come under attack for the high 
 
 275. Id.  
 276. For example, Ross Intelligence utilized Baker Hostetler’s 27 terabyte’s of data per-
taining to the Bernard Madoff case to help learn bankruptcy law. Ross Intelligence, ROSS 
Intelligence Announces Partnership with BakerHostetler, PRNEWSWIRE (May 5, 2016), 
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/ross-intelligence-announces-partnership-with-
bakerhostetler-300264039.html [https://perma.cc/35DC-57KF]. It should be noted that much 
of the publicity surrounding Ross Intelligence reported that the firm was “hiring” technology, 
implying that the system came ready-made. Id. In a reality, Ross Intelligence approached 
Baker Hostetler at an early stage in development knowing that the firm had a large amount 
of bankruptcy data, with a view to having the firm trial the product to develop the system’s 
understanding and knowledge of bankruptcy law. Id. 
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costs of access and a range of other inadequacies,277 proponents of the 
open data movement in the U.S. have increasingly made inroads into 
democratizing access in a way not achieved elsewhere.278 In England 
and Wales for example, there exists a highly fragmented data environ-
ment in which the publication of legal decisions has been privatized 
since inception, with “law reporters and publishers tak[ing] the view 
that the copy of the judge's text which they hold is their intellectual 
property.” 279 As such, the work of bringing together and providing free 
and open access to legal judgments has been left to charitable organi-
zations, such as the British and Irish Legal Information Institute 
(BAILII).280 Even taking into account resources such as PACER in the 
U.S., BAILII in the U.K., or the Australian equivalent (AUSTLII),281 
we observe less effort directed towards preserving or making accessi-
ble a whole range of potentially useful data collected by public agencies, 
including e-bundles and administrative data.  
The availability of public data is just one dimension of the data 
challenge. Law firms may hold a whole range of business intelligence, 
including contracts, legal briefs, legal research, emails, and/or corre-
spondence that can be mined for insights. However, this data is often 
held over a number of different jurisdictions (each with their own  
data protection laws), a number of different systems (current and  
legacy), and firms may impose different data storage systems across 
different practice areas or locations.282 From this emerges a series of 
unanswered questions regarding the extent to which emerging AI 
technologies will be able to handle siloed data in a way that integrates 
it more efficiently than the current data pipeline process demands.283  
It is not just the availability of data that is important, but also the 
form it takes. The use of ML on non-numerical data, such as natural 
 
 277. Jeff Roberts, Why the Federal Court Record System PACER is so Broken, and How 
to Fix it, GIGADOM (Aug. 27, 2014), https://gigaom.com/2014/08/27/why-the-federal-court-
record-system-pacer-is-so-broken-and-how-to-fix-it/ [https://perma.cc/T749-DNHR]. 
 278. Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 31, at 1361.  
 279. Philip Leith & Cynthia Fellows, Enabling Free On-line Access to UK Law Reports: 
The Copyright Problem, 18 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH 72, 80 (2010).  
 280. British and Irish Legal Information Institute, BAILII, https://www.bailii.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/BBH6-2SPR]. 
 285. About, AUSTRALIAN LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, https://www.austlii.edu.au/ 
about.html [https://perma.cc/JF9K-QE52]. 
 282. See, e.g., The Future Architecture of Law Firm Information: A New Foundation for 
Information Exchange, HUBBARD ONE & THOMSON REUTERS, https://legalsupportnetwork. 
co.uk/sites/default/files/HubbardOne_Whitepaper_OneViewFINAL_0811.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N6CQ-SFR2]. 
 283. See, e.g., Ignacio Terrizzano et al., Data Wrangling: The Challenging Journey from 
the Wild to the Lake, in 7TH BIENNIAL CONFERENCE ON INNOVATIVE DATA SYSTEMS 
RESEARCH (CIDR ’15) 4, 4–5 (2015); Alon Halevy et al., Managing Google’s Data Lake: An 
Overview of the GOODS System, 39 BULL. TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON DATA ENGINEERING 5–
14 (2016). 
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language, requires both an understanding of linguistics as well as 
massive amounts of training data to infer relationships between enti-
ties. It is not difficult to tag a word as a verb or a phrase as passive, 
but higher-level relationships that are inherent in understanding law 
require exponentially larger volumes of appropriately (i.e., human)  
annotated data as well as very sophisticated NLP algorithms.284 For 
this reason, associating sentiment with certain word phrases will  
require fewer training examples as compared to ingesting legalese, 
suggesting appropriate prior cases, or summarizing an internal narra-
tive and establishing a causal relationship. Most NLP systems remain 
largely context-specific, and do not generalize well to bodies of text 
that differ in nature to the training data—both subject matter and 
temporal considerations are relevant. 285  It has previously been ob-
served that because many NLP tools are trained on data that is now 
more than 20 years old, they exhibit superior performance for text 
written by older users.286 This is of particular relevance to law, given 
that frequent comparison is made between historical and modern texts. 
These challenges belie some of the limitations seen in previous 
studies and discussed at various points in the preceding sections, no-
tably: the development of models based on very small training sets,287 
 
 284. Ramon F. Astudillo et al., Learning Word Representations from Scarce and Noisy 
Data with Embedding Sub-spaces, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 53RD ANNUAL MEETING OF THE 
ASSOCIATION FOR COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS AND THE 7TH INTERNATIONAL JOINT 
CONFERENCE ON NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING 1074, 1074 (2015) (“The success of super-
vised systems largely depends on the amount and quality of the available training data, 
oftentimes, even more than the particular choice of learning algorithm (Banko and Brill, 
2001). Labeled data is, however, expensive to obtain, while unlabeled data is widely availa-
ble”). See also Tomas Mikolov et al., Efficient Estimation of Word Representations in Vector 
Space, CORNELL U. ARXIV (2013), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1301.3781.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
2VZH-9JQ8]; Kirk Roberts, Assessing the Corpus Size vs. Similarity Trade-off for Word  
Embeddings in Clinical NLP, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE CLINICAL NATURAL LANGUAGE 
PROCESSING WORKSHOP 54–63 (2016).  
 285. See, e.g., Allyson Ettinger et al., Towards Linguistically Generalizable NLP Systems: 
A Workshop and Shared Task, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST WORKSHOP ON BUILDING 
LINGUISTICALLY GENERALIZABLE NLP SYSTEMS 1 (2017); Ana Marasović, NLP’s generaliza-
tion problem, and how researchers are tackling it, GRADIENT (Aug. 22, 2018), https://thegradi-
ent.pub/frontiers-of-generalization-in-natural-language-processing/ [https://perma.cc/GR32-
VJB8]. 
 286. Dirk Hovy & Anders Søgaard, Tagging Performance Correlates with Author Age, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 53RD ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR COMPUTATIONAL 
LINGUISTICS AND THE 7TH INTERNATIONAL JOINT CONFERENCE ON NATURAL LANGUAGE 
PROCESSING 483, 487 (2015). 
 287. See, e.g., Bochereau et al., supra note 102, at 90. This paper uses what would be 
considered in contemporary research an extremely small number of examples (378) when 
training their model to discriminate between annulled and confirmed cases, particularly in 
the context of the number of inputs they use. Id. Though this may reflect the lack of digitized 
data available for training such algorithms in the early 1990s, as well as to a lesser extent 
the computational power and ipso facto the time it would have taken to train the neural 
network they employ. 
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the use of hypothetical data to simulate real cases,288 and the use of 
data that reflects only part of the phenomenon under observation.289 
Court data poses a particular challenge, not only because published 
decisions are difficult to acquire, but also because any attempt to pre-
dict certain outcomes, such as court decisions, requires more than just 
data from the court of interest. Cases that reach the upper courts are 
distinct in nature. This poses fewer problems if the intention of a sta-
tistical, ML, or data mining task is simply to look at cases that reach 
a particular higher court. However, if the intention is to understand 
which cases reach a court and how they differ from cases that do not 
progress as far, then the dataset must include cases from lower 
courts.290 This means any model produced using this data set is heavily 
conditioned on the fact that an applicant has progressed this far, ren-
dering such findings less relevant for people at earlier stages of the 
process.291 The same issues arise with respect to precedent versus com-
mon cases. Law relies on precedent, but this is reflected in the mass of 
common cases, the vast majority of which remain unreported.  
In circumstances where an appetite for investment and the neces-
sary data is available, a further challenge presents itself in terms of 
the availability of the expertise needed to bring ideas to fruition; an 
issue we refer to as “the skills gap.” 
C.   The Skills Gap 
Expertise at the intersection of law and technology is a relative rar-
ity.292 In the majority of jurisdictions, lack of exposure to opportunities 
to acquire quantitative and technological skills during legal study 
 
 288. For an example of use, see Zeleznikow & Stranieri, supra note 12, at 186; for com-
mentary of use, see Hunter, supra note 41, at 59–60.  
 289. This is the case with any algorithms attempting to predict which cases end up in 
court where the only data used is data drawn from case files. In these instances, the absence 
of data relating to those cases that do not end up at court is problematic. See, for example, 
the impact of the absence of full data in Naomi Burstyner et al., Why Do Some Civil Cases 
End Up in A Full Hearing? Formulating Litigation and Process Referral Indicia Through 
Text Analysis, 25 J. JUD. ADMIN. 257–95 (2016); see also Chen & Eagel, supra note 88, at 238. 
 290. In their work, Chen and Eagel explicitly identify this challenge by acknowledging 
that they were only able to investigate data relating to applicants who have made it to the 
refugee court system. Chen & Eagel, supra note 88, at 237. Another important issue that 
Chen and Eagel explicitly note is how to deal with missing data, with 80% of the cases in 
their dataset missing at least one feature. Id. at 238.  
 291. Capturing the experiences of those who do not make it to court typically require the 
use of wide-scale, expensively compiled legal need survey data. See Charles E. Clark & 
Emma Corstvet, The Lawyer and the Public: An A.A.L.S. Survey, 47 YALE L.J. 1272 (1938) 
(the first of these surveys); PASCOE PLEASENCE ET AL., PATHS TO JUSTICE: A PAST, PRESENT 
AND FUTURE ROADMAP (2013) (summary of current surveys and impact). 
 292. Catrina Denvir, Scaling the Gap: Legal Education and Data Literacy, in 
MODERNISING LEGAL EDUCATION 73 (Catrina Denvir ed., 2020). 
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culminates in legal AI being relegated to a fringe activity in law 
schools.293 Whilst it may not be necessary to have legal, computing, 
and quantitative skills in order to make a contribution to research and 
development in legal AI, the early domination of the field by logic pro-
grammers (residing ostensibly in computer science departments) was 
not without criticism. Not because it was impossible for a logician to 
understand law, but because it was observed that logic programmers 
all too often failed to move beyond their epistemological view of the 
world as a computational model resulting in the development of logic 
models that did not accord with how law operated in practice.294  
The skills gap presents implications for development of the field, as 
well validating broader concerns regarding the potential rule of law 
impact and appropriateness of the models developed. As data mining 
interfaces begin to democratize access to ML techniques, rendering 
software more accessible to those without technical expertise, the  
ethical risks of data-driven technologies increase. Having data is only 
one dimension to solving a complex problem. The inability to explain 
patterns can actually be exacerbated when applying ML techniques, 
because the process of analysis is divorced from the traditional  
scientific method. In law, traditional qualitative analysis provides a 
conceptual underpinning that aids quantitative analysis. The data 
does not do all the work for us, and what it reveals is only useful (and 
only transferrable to other domains) if it is anchored in a broader the-
ory or hypothesis about how certain phenomena operate or inter- 
relate. 295  This disconnect between “measurable data streams and 
meaningful explanatory theories to frame the data” is defined as the 
“theory-data gap,” it represents “a key barrier to meaningful social and 
behavioral modeling,” demanding a “move from purely data-driven 
work to theory-informed work” and a need to “tighten the iterative loop 
between theory and data analysis.”296 It is a problem common not just 
to law, but also to medical applications of AI.297 Moreover, this is not 
just an issue in respect of ML-based reasoning systems. As Ashley 
noted in respect of analogical reasoning “analogy is a way of stating  
 
 
 
 293. For a more detailed exposition, see Philip Leith, IT and Law, and Law Schools, 14 
INT’L. REV. L. COMPUTERS & TECH. 171 (2000).  
 294. Leith, Fundamental Errors in Legal Logic Programming, supra note 45, at 552. 
 299. See, e.g., Peter Norvig, All We Want are the Facts, Ma’am, NORVIG.COM, 
http://norvig.com/fact-check.html [https://perma.cc/FQ3U-ZSGL]. 
 296. OSOBA & DAVIS, supra note 100, at iii. 
 297. Whilst methods of statistical, data-centric modeling were not unheard of during the 
early stage of medical AI development. See, e.g., J.R. Staniland et al., Clinical Presentation 
of Acute Abdomen: Study of 600 Patients, 3 BRITISH MED. J. 393, 394 (1972). They were not 
widely applied in part because the biomedical understanding thought necessary to properly 
model the underlying processes was lacking. SZOLOVITS, supra note 59, at 6. 
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a conclusion, not reaching one, and theory must do the real work, 
where theory is the principle that links cases or that separates 
them.”298 
New variations of ML do not address issues of skills shortage, nor 
do they do away with the need for an underlying theoretical conceptu-
alization of the construct that a ML model is attempting to represent. 
NLP offers an instrumental case study in this regard. Previous epochs 
of NLP have been characterized by great collaboration between  
domain specialists (linguists) and computer scientists/AI researchers. 
The Cocke-Younger-Kamasi algorithm 299  recognizes whether a  
sentence is consistent with a given set of grammatical rules, and  
generates a chart (parse tree) to reflect the structure of the  
sentence. 300  Notably, this algorithm is informed by grammatical  
theory developed by Chomsky 301  as well as efficient computational 
techniques developed by Bellman,302 and is thus a good example of  
the interplay between linguistics and computer science. Admittedly, 
computer scientists with little linguistic understanding can design 
deep-learning algorithms: a word-embedding algorithm can learn the 
quantitative representation of the text on which a deep neural network 
can be trained. However, throwing data at a problem is only possible 
with access to huge training sets (of the type retained by large  
technology companies) and more limited training sets are likely to  
result in over-fitting and/or increased error/uncertainty. Rather than 
giving rise to opportunities for innovation, these pragmatic constraints 
implicitly and explicitly shape the role that AI occupies in and outside 
of law, and at times, actively militate against innovation. 
D.   The Shape of AI to Come 
It is possible for law to be reflected by AI systems in a variety of 
different ways, and continued technological development is likely to 
yield further methods by which to model the law and legal reasoning. 
Whether or not these systems are designed, developed, and deployed 
to benefit the majority or the minority remains to be seen. Legal AI 
 
 302. Kevin Ashley et al., Legal Reasoning and Artificial Intelligence: How Computers 
“Think” Like Lawyers, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 2, 20 (2001). 
 299. This algorithm was derived by three researchers independently. See Daniel H. 
Younger, Recognition and Parsing of Context-Free Languages in Time n3, 10 INFO. & 
CONTROL 189, 189–90 (1967); T. KASAMI, AN EFFICIENT RECOGNITION AND SYNTAX-ANALYSIS 
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 300. Younger, supra note 303, at 189–90; KASAMI, supra note 303; COCKE & SCHWARTZ, 
supra note 303.  
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does not (in and of itself) signal the beginning of a new era of tools 
capable of making good on the promise of universal access to justice or 
unfailing adherence to the rule of law. As our analysis of the pragmatic 
challenges reveal, these objectives cannot be realized without a sup-
porting infrastructure. Nevertheless, given the exponential advances 
in data and processing power seen over the last two decades, we are 
still at a relatively early stage of data-driven AI development. That 
there are few examples to illustrate how the application of AI to law 
and the representation of law via AI might enhance the rule of law and 
access to justice is not to say that such uses are not possible. Nor is it 
the case that in order for one group to gain another group must neces-
sarily lose, even if the conditions steering development in the field tend 
to favor private over public interests.  
However, safeguarding the rule of law and the protections en-
shrined in the constitution requires a commitment to using AI in an 
ethical and informed manner, guided by a series of values that operate 
to minimize risk. Better practice guidelines supporting the develop-
ment of automated systems intended to apply legislation to determine 
an entitlement, offer a starting point as to what considerations ought 
to guide deployment. These identify the substance, breadth, structural, 
and semantic complexity of the legislation; the remit of the authorizing 
agency; the transparency of decisions reached; the grounds for decision 
review; privacy; data accuracy; auditing; de-skilling of decision makers; 
and the cost of implementation and maintenance as relevant factors.303 
Building on these guidelines, we propose emerging legal AI tools are 
assessed with reference to the extent to which they: 
• Operate to reveal rather than embed bias; 
• Promote the accessibility of the legal system;  
• Ensure the processes by which outcomes reached are trans-
parent; 
• Balance rather than entrench power imbalances between  
parties;   
• Enhance rather than diminish the intelligibility of legal  
language; 
• Sustain or improve upon the existing models of due process; 
• Distribute benefits; 
• Make clear the model of law imposed; and, 
• Benefit from on-going monitoring and refinement. 
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Furthermore, we suggest the need to304:  
• Make the system/algorithm publicly available; 
• Implement independent auditing mechanisms; 
• Publish the data used to train the system; 
• Categorize systems in line with an established algorithmic 
risk scale; 
• Inform users where AI has been used in a process or  
decision and make clear the inputs that featured in the deci-
sion; 
• Make clear who is accountable for any action that arises as 
a by-product of the use of the tool; and, 
• Ensure that mechanisms are in place to compensate those  
negatively impacted by mistaken decisions. 
These suggestions represent the start of a framework for evaluating 
AI in law, though the feasibility, practicality, efficacy, and impact of 
the suggestions provided will remain a work in progress as technolog-
ical and regulatory infrastructures continue to evolve. Adequately cap-
turing the full range of philosophical, practical, jurisprudential, dem-
ocratic, societal, and rule of law implications that may arise as a result 
of AI adoption in law, and regulating these risks via appropriate gov-
ernance structures, remains a critical focus for future research.  
V.   CONCLUSION 
Whilst early AI efforts in the 1980s focused on the development  
of expert logic systems in law, as the processing power and storage 
capability of computers have grown, so too has the use of data-driven 
AI, represented by quantitative and “machine learning” methods. 
Studies demonstrate that it is possible to apply ML to a range of legal 
tasks, many of which are documented above. In adding to this litera-
ture, this paper has considered what potential AI holds as a means by 
which to improve the functioning of legal systems, democratize access 
to justice and legal services, address latent legal need, protect citizens 
from abuses of power, address systemic bias, and promote greater  
institutional accountability and transparency. Such questions are  
not new, and the implications they pose are the same issues with 
which those who create and study the law have always struggled.  
Nevertheless, as technology infrastructures continue to evolve, 
 
 304. A number of these suggestions were adapted from the work of Copeland. See  
Eddie Copeland, 10 Principles for Public Sector use of Algorithmic Decision Making, NESTA 
BLOG (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.nesta.org.uk/blog/code-of-standards-public-sector-use-
algorithmic-decision-making [https://perma.cc/86TM-T5F9].  
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increasing in complexity and sophistication and reaching further into 
our lives than ever before, these questions demand renewed attention.  
This Paper has engaged with many of these questions and the  
constitutional and rule of law challenges posed by AI. We have raised 
concerns regarding the way in which AI systems impose a particular 
theoretical paradigm, limiting space for legal dialectical pluralism. We 
have noted a number of challenges relating to the capacity of AI to 
subvert the intent and purpose of the law or to fail to reflect the com-
plexity of the expression of law. We have also considered the potential 
implications of AI in the context of the rule of law, observing the need 
for AI systems to balance a range of competing priorities and question-
ing their ability to do so. Finally, we have considered the pragmatic 
issues that are likely to shape the future of AI development in law, 
assessed the implications that these issues pose by reference to the 
likely beneficiaries of AI technologies, and offered a range of criteria 
that may form the basis of a more well-developed suite of safeguards 
that scaffold development in the field.  
We conclude by emphasizing that systems capable of creating, in-
terpreting, applying, and enforcing the law requires a transformation 
of what we understand as “law.” The vision of law reflected in AI  
systems is shaped by the limits of the technology used to create that 
vision. Where law (whether represented by interpretation, bargaining, 
or enforcement) is transposed into rule-based and data-driven AI sys-
tems, nuance is supplanted by simplicity and relational representation 
in a manner that can operate to undermine the ends to which law is 
directed. Any technological representation of law and the legal obliga-
tions it spawns is necessarily bound—and in some instances irrevoca-
bly limited—by what the contemporary technology makes possible. 
The view of law through the eyes of AI would have been more different 
in the 1980s than today, not because the law has fundamentally 
changed, but because our ability to express law and legal relationships 
via technology has changed.  
Law is not just process, rules, sanctions, norms, or behavior. It 
ought not reside in the hands of those with the resources or power to 
direct a self-serving agenda, but in balancing the interests of many 
voices in society. The consequences that arise from any transformation, 
whether in the form of: value-added, plurality lost, efficiency gained, 
flexibility preserved, costs reduced, profit made, or debate and freedom 
safeguarded, are relevant only in so far as they impact upon the  
capacity of the law to achieve (and to be seen to achieve) justice. Any 
implementation of AI must be able to justify a contribution to that end.  
For this reason, legal AI must be evaluated in advance of deploy-
ment with reference to a framework that adequately safeguards those 
principles enshrined in the constitution and the rule of law. We have 
outlined some potential components of such a framework in Part IV, 
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though we recognize that not all objectives are equal, or for that matter, 
equally achievable. It may be easier to determine the key beneficiaries 
of a particular technology than to project a wide range of risks into the 
future. Whilst we can never know with certainty what threats might 
accompany a particular form of legal AI in advance of deployment, we 
see the development of a “rule of legal AI” as an important governance 
mechanism guiding future development in the field and suggest  
on-going research in order to better illuminate its contours. 
 
 
